I have tried to place this critique in the context of my framework for thinking about American politics, and about Trump 2.0 in particular. I see three political ideologies at work in American life, which we could call nationalism (espoused by Trump Republicans), liberalism (espoused by establishment Democrats), and socialism (espoused by social justice Democrats). (In the new political compass due to YouTuber JREG, these correspond to what he calls “post-racial fascism”, “reactionary centrism”, and “the balkanized left”, with “e/acc” being novel enough to form its own category.) Meanwhile, as a synopsis of the agenda of Trumpian nationalism, I think Steve Bannon’s three-point summary is pretty good: cut immigration, fix jobs-and-trade, and stop the forever wars. There’s lots more going on in Trump 2.0, but those three imperatives are very visible.
This allows me to start relating this critique to my own framework. Part 6 is specifically about one of those three imperatives, immigration. Part 7 and half of part 9 are about economic management (jobs, trade, the deficit). Part 8 and part 10 both say something about Trump’s policy on war and peace.
Parts 4 (J6 as coup), 5 (authoritarianism), and 8 (lies and corruption), it seems to me, are about Trump’s practice of politics—the way that Trump pursues his agenda, what he does to take and keep power, and his self-interested use of it.
This leaves part 2 (foreign aid), part 3 (vaccines and medical research), half of part 9 (farm animal welfare). These might be regarded as miscellaneous minor parts of the Trump agenda which (in the author’s opinion) have exceptionally negative consequences. However, these also offer us a glimpse of some broader features of Trump 2.0.
For example, I have characterized Trump 2.0 as a coalition of alternative intellectual narratives from outside the institutions, that survived online and which now have power over the institutions. This includes Tulsi Gabbard’s anti-war sentiment, Epstein conspiracism (though they’ve tried to disown that one), immigration restriction… and the subject of part 3, RFK Jr’s anti-vax MAHA agenda.
A related phenomenon is that there are often ideas behind Trump 2.0 actions, but you don’t hear about the ideas, you only hear about the actions. Bannon’s three-point synopsis of what Trumpian nationalism stands for, might be the biggest example. Then there are the economists like Robert Lighthizer and Stephen Miran who offer unconventional rationales for Trump economic policy. In the case of foreign aid (part 2), Ross Douthat at the New York Times interviewed a Trump State Department official, Jeremy Lewin, who said that the new agenda on foreign aid is about re-subordinating it to US government policy, after a period in which it was run quasi-autonomously by the NGOs themselves.
On the other hand, overturning laws against cruelty to farm animals (part 9), I would consider to be an example of Trump’s business-friendly bias in favor of deregulation. We also saw that in an area of particular interest to Less Wrong, the AI industry.
I have tried to place this critique in the context of my framework for thinking about American politics, and about Trump 2.0 in particular. I see three political ideologies at work in American life, which we could call nationalism (espoused by Trump Republicans), liberalism (espoused by establishment Democrats), and socialism (espoused by social justice Democrats). (In the new political compass due to YouTuber JREG, these correspond to what he calls “post-racial fascism”, “reactionary centrism”, and “the balkanized left”, with “e/acc” being novel enough to form its own category.) Meanwhile, as a synopsis of the agenda of Trumpian nationalism, I think Steve Bannon’s three-point summary is pretty good: cut immigration, fix jobs-and-trade, and stop the forever wars. There’s lots more going on in Trump 2.0, but those three imperatives are very visible.
This allows me to start relating this critique to my own framework. Part 6 is specifically about one of those three imperatives, immigration. Part 7 and half of part 9 are about economic management (jobs, trade, the deficit). Part 8 and part 10 both say something about Trump’s policy on war and peace.
Parts 4 (J6 as coup), 5 (authoritarianism), and 8 (lies and corruption), it seems to me, are about Trump’s practice of politics—the way that Trump pursues his agenda, what he does to take and keep power, and his self-interested use of it.
This leaves part 2 (foreign aid), part 3 (vaccines and medical research), half of part 9 (farm animal welfare). These might be regarded as miscellaneous minor parts of the Trump agenda which (in the author’s opinion) have exceptionally negative consequences. However, these also offer us a glimpse of some broader features of Trump 2.0.
For example, I have characterized Trump 2.0 as a coalition of alternative intellectual narratives from outside the institutions, that survived online and which now have power over the institutions. This includes Tulsi Gabbard’s anti-war sentiment, Epstein conspiracism (though they’ve tried to disown that one), immigration restriction… and the subject of part 3, RFK Jr’s anti-vax MAHA agenda.
A related phenomenon is that there are often ideas behind Trump 2.0 actions, but you don’t hear about the ideas, you only hear about the actions. Bannon’s three-point synopsis of what Trumpian nationalism stands for, might be the biggest example. Then there are the economists like Robert Lighthizer and Stephen Miran who offer unconventional rationales for Trump economic policy. In the case of foreign aid (part 2), Ross Douthat at the New York Times interviewed a Trump State Department official, Jeremy Lewin, who said that the new agenda on foreign aid is about re-subordinating it to US government policy, after a period in which it was run quasi-autonomously by the NGOs themselves.
On the other hand, overturning laws against cruelty to farm animals (part 9), I would consider to be an example of Trump’s business-friendly bias in favor of deregulation. We also saw that in an area of particular interest to Less Wrong, the AI industry.