So there isn’t, within physics, any way for “the real you to be having an experience” in the case where the teleporter malfunctioned, and “someone else to be having the experience” in the case where the teleporter worked.
I’m not convinced by this. All you would need to determine the original is an accurate clock. When the teleporter copies EarthMe, time has to pass as the information is transfered to SpaceMe. If I’m EarthMe I expect to watch the clock function correctly, while SpaceMe should expect the clock to jump slightly as EarthMe’s last visual input of the clock is rewritten by SpaceMe’s first visual input.
This question doesn’t really make sense from a naturalistic perspective, because there isn’t any causal mechanism that could be responsible for the difference between “a version of me that exists at 3pm tomorrow, whose experiences I should anticipate experiencing” and “an exact physical copy of me that exists at 3pm tomorrow, whose experiences I shouldn’t anticipate experiencing”.
Say Me1 decides to copy themself, creating Me2. We agree Me1 shouldn’t expect to experience Me1 and Me2′s experiences at the same time, but I don’t think Me1 should expect their listener to start listening to Me2 post-copy. Instead, I believe Me2 would recieve an identical listener to Me1, but the two listeners would be distinct (otherwise Me1 should expect to experience both minds simultaneously.)
Nor is there a law of physics saying “your subjective point of view immediately blips out of existence and is replaced by Someone Else’s point of view if your spacetime coordinates change a lot in a short period of time (even though they don’t blip out of existence when your spacetime coordinates change a little or change over a longer period of time)”.
The best analogy I can think of is as follows: You have a camera recording constant video. If you were to clone this camera exactly, you shouldn’t expect camera 1′s storage to start recording camera 2′s output, even if the two cameras are perfectly identical.
I’m not convinced by this. All you would need to determine the original is an accurate clock. When the teleporter copies EarthMe, time has to pass as the information is transfered to SpaceMe. If I’m EarthMe I expect to watch the clock function correctly, while SpaceMe should expect the clock to jump slightly as EarthMe’s last visual input of the clock is rewritten by SpaceMe’s first visual input.
Say Me1 decides to copy themself, creating Me2. We agree Me1 shouldn’t expect to experience Me1 and Me2′s experiences at the same time, but I don’t think Me1 should expect their listener to start listening to Me2 post-copy. Instead, I believe Me2 would recieve an identical listener to Me1, but the two listeners would be distinct (otherwise Me1 should expect to experience both minds simultaneously.)
The best analogy I can think of is as follows: You have a camera recording constant video. If you were to clone this camera exactly, you shouldn’t expect camera 1′s storage to start recording camera 2′s output, even if the two cameras are perfectly identical.