I agree that it’s unlikely we could ever be 100% confident in some proposition here. But, with sufficiently high fidelity neurostimulation protocols (likely invasive ones) coupled with direct reports, I remain optimistic we could develop something like asymptotic confidence in a given theory of consciousness.
I doubt we could ever keep the armchair philosophers happy. But for the consciousness engineers (i.e. the people who actually want to do something with a theory of consciousness), I think this should suffice.
I’m not saying it’s not possible for us to be confident in some specific proposition.
I am saying that the state of having different qualia while preserving the same functional state is impossible in principle and that, due to Chalmers, it is impossible in the case of the human brain in this specific case.
I doubt we could ever keep the armchair philosophers happy. But for the consciousness engineers
Without philosophers, or without someone who isn’t a philosopher but does correct philosophy, you can’t arrive at the correct ontology of consciousness.
Keep in mind the theory of consciousness can’t make any falsifiable empirical predictions—the biological theory of consciousness, computationalism and other kinds of functionalism all make identical empirical predictions.
If you want to distinguish the physicalist theory of consciousness from some other, you can’t do it by making empirical predictions and comparing them to empirical results.
You can do it by non-empirical reasoning, but all those attempts fail for the reasons I explained in my comment (they are actually arguments against the physicalist theories of consciousness).
I agree that it’s unlikely we could ever be 100% confident in some proposition here. But, with sufficiently high fidelity neurostimulation protocols (likely invasive ones) coupled with direct reports, I remain optimistic we could develop something like asymptotic confidence in a given theory of consciousness.
I doubt we could ever keep the armchair philosophers happy. But for the consciousness engineers (i.e. the people who actually want to do something with a theory of consciousness), I think this should suffice.
I’m not saying it’s not possible for us to be confident in some specific proposition.
I am saying that the state of having different qualia while preserving the same functional state is impossible in principle and that, due to Chalmers, it is impossible in the case of the human brain in this specific case.
Without philosophers, or without someone who isn’t a philosopher but does correct philosophy, you can’t arrive at the correct ontology of consciousness.
Keep in mind the theory of consciousness can’t make any falsifiable empirical predictions—the biological theory of consciousness, computationalism and other kinds of functionalism all make identical empirical predictions.
If you want to distinguish the physicalist theory of consciousness from some other, you can’t do it by making empirical predictions and comparing them to empirical results.
You can do it by non-empirical reasoning, but all those attempts fail for the reasons I explained in my comment (they are actually arguments against the physicalist theories of consciousness).