I’m gonna ramble a bit to clear up my own thoughts, apologies if this sounds obvious...
The Shapley value is the only value operator defined on all coalitional games that satisfies some intuitive axioms. (They’re all very natural and don’t include “Equal Impact”.) Proportional allocation isn’t defined on all coalitional games, only a subset of them where you arbitrarily chose some numbers as players’ “contributions”. (A general coalitional game doesn’t come with that structure—it’s just a set of 2^N numbers that specifies the payoff for each possible cooperating clique.) After this arbitrary step, proportional allocation does seem to satisfy the same natural axioms that the Shapley value does. But you can’t expand it to all coalitional games coherently, because otherwise the intuitive axioms would force your “contribution” values to become Shapley values.
In general, I see no reason to use proportional allocation over the Shapley value. If each player suffers a loss of utility proportional to their individual contribution, or any other side effect with an arbitrary cost function, just include it in the SV calculation.
Ok, I think I can articulate a reason for my doubt about the Shapley Value. One nice property for a fair division method to have is that the players can’t game the system by transferring their underlying contributions to one another. That is, Alice and Eve shouldn’t be able to increase their total negentropy allocation (at Bob’s expense) by transferring matter from one to the other ahead of time. Proportional allocation satisfies this property, but Shapley Value doesn’t (unless it happens to coincide with proportional allocation).
If such transfer of resources is allowed, your share of negentropy must depend only on your contribution, the total contribution and the number of players. If we further assume that zero contribution implies zero share, it’s straightforward to prove (by division in half, etc.) that proportional allocation is the only possible scheme.
This still isn’t very satisfying. John Nash would have advised us to model the situation with free transfer as a game within some larger class of games and apply some general concept like the Shapley value to make the answer pop out. But I’m not yet sure how to do that.
If such transfer of resources is allowed, your share of negentropy must depend only on your contribution, the total contribution and the number of players. If we further assume that zero contribution implies zero share, it’s straightforward to prove (by division in half, etc.) that proportional allocation is the only possible scheme.
One difficulty with proportional allocation is deciding how to measure contributions. Do you divide proportionately to mass contributed, or do you divide proportionately to negentropy contributed?
In Shapley value, a coalition of Alice and Eve against Bob is given equal weight with the other two possible two-against-one coalitions. Yes, Shapley does permit ‘gaming; in ways that proportional allocation does not, but it treats all possible ‘gamings’ (or coalition structures) equally.
According to Moulin, there are several different sets of axioms that can be used to uniquely derive the Shapley Value, and Equal Impact is among them (it can be used to derive Shapley Value by itself, if I understand correctly).
The problem with all of those sets of axioms is that each set seems to include at least one axiom that isn’t completely intuitive. For example, using the terminology in the Wikipedia article, we can use Symmetry, Additivity and Null Player, and while Symmetry and Null Player seem perfectly reasonable, I’m not so sure about Additivity.
I’m gonna ramble a bit to clear up my own thoughts, apologies if this sounds obvious...
The Shapley value is the only value operator defined on all coalitional games that satisfies some intuitive axioms. (They’re all very natural and don’t include “Equal Impact”.) Proportional allocation isn’t defined on all coalitional games, only a subset of them where you arbitrarily chose some numbers as players’ “contributions”. (A general coalitional game doesn’t come with that structure—it’s just a set of 2^N numbers that specifies the payoff for each possible cooperating clique.) After this arbitrary step, proportional allocation does seem to satisfy the same natural axioms that the Shapley value does. But you can’t expand it to all coalitional games coherently, because otherwise the intuitive axioms would force your “contribution” values to become Shapley values.
In general, I see no reason to use proportional allocation over the Shapley value. If each player suffers a loss of utility proportional to their individual contribution, or any other side effect with an arbitrary cost function, just include it in the SV calculation.
Ok, I think I can articulate a reason for my doubt about the Shapley Value. One nice property for a fair division method to have is that the players can’t game the system by transferring their underlying contributions to one another. That is, Alice and Eve shouldn’t be able to increase their total negentropy allocation (at Bob’s expense) by transferring matter from one to the other ahead of time. Proportional allocation satisfies this property, but Shapley Value doesn’t (unless it happens to coincide with proportional allocation).
If such transfer of resources is allowed, your share of negentropy must depend only on your contribution, the total contribution and the number of players. If we further assume that zero contribution implies zero share, it’s straightforward to prove (by division in half, etc.) that proportional allocation is the only possible scheme.
This still isn’t very satisfying. John Nash would have advised us to model the situation with free transfer as a game within some larger class of games and apply some general concept like the Shapley value to make the answer pop out. But I’m not yet sure how to do that.
One difficulty with proportional allocation is deciding how to measure contributions. Do you divide proportionately to mass contributed, or do you divide proportionately to negentropy contributed?
In Shapley value, a coalition of Alice and Eve against Bob is given equal weight with the other two possible two-against-one coalitions. Yes, Shapley does permit ‘gaming; in ways that proportional allocation does not, but it treats all possible ‘gamings’ (or coalition structures) equally.
According to Moulin, there are several different sets of axioms that can be used to uniquely derive the Shapley Value, and Equal Impact is among them (it can be used to derive Shapley Value by itself, if I understand correctly).
The problem with all of those sets of axioms is that each set seems to include at least one axiom that isn’t completely intuitive. For example, using the terminology in the Wikipedia article, we can use Symmetry, Additivity and Null Player, and while Symmetry and Null Player seem perfectly reasonable, I’m not so sure about Additivity.