I was really hoping for a cogent argument for moral realism, and this is more a giant wall of text that is repetitive more than additive, and consists mostly of the same weak argument in multiple ways. “This sure feels wrong to me, and that’s probably universal”.
One issue that is downplayed is that it’s not at all clear whether or not the way professional moral philosophers think about these issues reflects how nonphilosophers think about them. The best current studies on how nonphilosophers think about these issues finds that when you explain metaethical positions to people, and give them the standard metaethical positions to choose from, about 75% favor antirealist positions. The participants in question were only in the United States and were sampled from populations more likely to be antirealists (including e.g., students), but the high levels of antirealism still raise serious questions about whether moral realists are correct when they presume all or most people find realism intuitive. There is little evidence this is the case, and quite strong evidence that it isn’t.
See, for instance, Pölzler, T., & Wright, J. C. (2020). Anti-realist pluralism: A new approach to folk metaethics. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 11(1), 53-82.
Yup. And it’s not clear professional philosophers are actually seeking disconfirmation of their theories. From outside, it seems a lot like they want to be mathematicians (seeking consistency and soundness, though in a domain that’s less concrete), rather than scientists or engineers (seeking reality or usage).
Very amusingly, philosophers who believe in moral realism should not CARE what most people think, right? It’s possible for every human and animal who’s ever lived to be factually incorrect about moral truths, right?
I certainly don’t think they’re seeking disconfirmation of their theories. Quite the contrary, much of analytic philosophy seems dedicated to starting with one’s conclusions, then coming up with justifications for why they are correct. That seems to be built into the very method. Have you read Bishop and Trout’s paper that makes this point?
Here it is: Bishop, M., & Trout, J. D. (2005). The pathologies of standard analytic epistemology. Nous, 39(4), 696-714.
And here’s a quote:
Now, back to the stasis requirement: If an epistemic theory forced us to radically alter our considered epistemic judgments (e.g., our epistemic judgments in reflective equilibrium), then ipso facto that theory is unacceptable. While perhaps not all proponents of SAE embrace the stasis requirement (e.g., see Unger 1984), we think that Kim is right in identifying it as a success condition that most proponents of SAE place on epistemological theories. But it is not a requirement that is often explicitly stated. So where do we find it? We suggest that the commitment to stasis is embodied in the method of SAE. Philosophers accept or reject an epistemological theory on the basis of whether it accords with their considered judgments. (p. 701)
I was really hoping for a cogent argument for moral realism, and this is more a giant wall of text that is repetitive more than additive, and consists mostly of the same weak argument in multiple ways. “This sure feels wrong to me, and that’s probably universal”.
One issue that is downplayed is that it’s not at all clear whether or not the way professional moral philosophers think about these issues reflects how nonphilosophers think about them. The best current studies on how nonphilosophers think about these issues finds that when you explain metaethical positions to people, and give them the standard metaethical positions to choose from, about 75% favor antirealist positions. The participants in question were only in the United States and were sampled from populations more likely to be antirealists (including e.g., students), but the high levels of antirealism still raise serious questions about whether moral realists are correct when they presume all or most people find realism intuitive. There is little evidence this is the case, and quite strong evidence that it isn’t.
See, for instance, Pölzler, T., & Wright, J. C. (2020). Anti-realist pluralism: A new approach to folk metaethics. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 11(1), 53-82.
Yup. And it’s not clear professional philosophers are actually seeking disconfirmation of their theories. From outside, it seems a lot like they want to be mathematicians (seeking consistency and soundness, though in a domain that’s less concrete), rather than scientists or engineers (seeking reality or usage).
Very amusingly, philosophers who believe in moral realism should not CARE what most people think, right? It’s possible for every human and animal who’s ever lived to be factually incorrect about moral truths, right?
I certainly don’t think they’re seeking disconfirmation of their theories. Quite the contrary, much of analytic philosophy seems dedicated to starting with one’s conclusions, then coming up with justifications for why they are correct. That seems to be built into the very method. Have you read Bishop and Trout’s paper that makes this point?
Here it is: Bishop, M., & Trout, J. D. (2005). The pathologies of standard analytic epistemology. Nous, 39(4), 696-714.
And here’s a quote: