-”I think the central question would be: Do you think that there are facts about what people morally should or shouldn’t do, or what’s morally good or bad, that are true independent of people’s goals, standards, or values? If yes, that’s moral realism. If not, that’s moral antirealism.”
I certainly don’t believe that the truth of moral facts is dependent on people’s goals, standards, or values; the qualifier I would give is that our beliefs about moral facts are the same thing (tautologically) as our moral standards. So I guess I am a moral realist? Or maybe you are right that my position doesn’t fit into any of the standard categories. I guess it doesn’t matter, I was just curious...
-”Regarding this statement: “it’s wrong to torture babies for fun,” this is a normative moral claim, not a metaethical one. A moral antirealist can agree with this (I’m an antirealist, and I agree with it). Nothing about agreeing or disagreeing with that claim entails realism.”
Right, the litmus test was whether the statement is “true”. Sorry about being unclear.
I’m not sure if you’re a moral realist. What do you mean when you say this?
A moral realist may think that there are e.g., facts about what you should or shouldn’t do that you are obligated to comply with independent of whether doing so would be consistent with your goals, standards, or values. So, for instance, they would hold that you “should’t torture babies for fun,” regardless of whether doing so is consistent with your values. In doing so, they aren’t appeal to their own values, or anyone else’s values, but to facts about what’s morally right or wrong that are true without reference to, and in a way that doesn’t depend on, any particular evaluative standpoint.
-”In doing so, they aren’t appeal to their own values, or anyone else’s values, but to facts about what’s morally right or wrong that are true without reference to, and in a way that doesn’t depend on, any particular evaluative standpoint.”
OK, so now it sounds like I am not a moral realist! I definitely think that by making a moral claim you are appealing to other people’s values, since other people’s values is the only thing that could possibly cause them to accept your moral claim. However, the moral claim is still of the form “X is true regardless of whether it is consistent with anyone’s values”.
A moral realist would think that there are facts about what is morally right or wrong that are true regardless of what anyone thinks about them. One way to put this is that they aren’t made true by our desires, goals, standards, values, beliefs, and so on. Rather, they are true in a way more like how claims about e.g., the mass of an object are true. Facts about the mass of an object aren’t made true by our believing them or preferring them to be the case.
-”One way to put this is that they aren’t made true by our desires, goals, standards, values, beliefs, and so on.”
OK, I am a moral realist under this formulation.
-”Rather, they are true in a way more like how claims about e.g., the mass of an object are true.”
I guess it depends on what you mean by “in a way more like”. Moral claims are pretty fundamentally different from physical claims, I don’t see how to get around that—one way to put it would be that the notions of right and wrong are not inductive generalizations over observed phenomena—another way to put it would be that the question “what does it mean for something to be right or wrong” is meaningless, the only meaningful question is “what do we mean when we say that something is right or wrong” (to which the answer is “we do not mean anything, rather we speak to advocate or condemn something”). But if you are just referring to some surface-level similarity like “neither of them is actually a secret way of referring to the speaker’s beliefs/opinions/values”, then sure.
Moral realists are going to differ with respect to what they think the metaphysical status of the moral facts are. Moral naturalists may see them roughly as a kind of natural fact, so moral facts might be facts about e.g., increases in wellbeing, while non-naturalists would maintain that moral facts aren’t reducible to natural facts.
-”I think the central question would be: Do you think that there are facts about what people morally should or shouldn’t do, or what’s morally good or bad, that are true independent of people’s goals, standards, or values? If yes, that’s moral realism. If not, that’s moral antirealism.”
I certainly don’t believe that the truth of moral facts is dependent on people’s goals, standards, or values; the qualifier I would give is that our beliefs about moral facts are the same thing (tautologically) as our moral standards. So I guess I am a moral realist? Or maybe you are right that my position doesn’t fit into any of the standard categories. I guess it doesn’t matter, I was just curious...
-”Regarding this statement: “it’s wrong to torture babies for fun,” this is a normative moral claim, not a metaethical one. A moral antirealist can agree with this (I’m an antirealist, and I agree with it). Nothing about agreeing or disagreeing with that claim entails realism.”
Right, the litmus test was whether the statement is “true”. Sorry about being unclear.
I’m not sure if you’re a moral realist. What do you mean when you say this?
A moral realist may think that there are e.g., facts about what you should or shouldn’t do that you are obligated to comply with independent of whether doing so would be consistent with your goals, standards, or values. So, for instance, they would hold that you “should’t torture babies for fun,” regardless of whether doing so is consistent with your values. In doing so, they aren’t appeal to their own values, or anyone else’s values, but to facts about what’s morally right or wrong that are true without reference to, and in a way that doesn’t depend on, any particular evaluative standpoint.
-”In doing so, they aren’t appeal to their own values, or anyone else’s values, but to facts about what’s morally right or wrong that are true without reference to, and in a way that doesn’t depend on, any particular evaluative standpoint.”
OK, so now it sounds like I am not a moral realist! I definitely think that by making a moral claim you are appealing to other people’s values, since other people’s values is the only thing that could possibly cause them to accept your moral claim. However, the moral claim is still of the form “X is true regardless of whether it is consistent with anyone’s values”.
A moral realist would think that there are facts about what is morally right or wrong that are true regardless of what anyone thinks about them. One way to put this is that they aren’t made true by our desires, goals, standards, values, beliefs, and so on. Rather, they are true in a way more like how claims about e.g., the mass of an object are true. Facts about the mass of an object aren’t made true by our believing them or preferring them to be the case.
-”One way to put this is that they aren’t made true by our desires, goals, standards, values, beliefs, and so on.”
OK, I am a moral realist under this formulation.
-”Rather, they are true in a way more like how claims about e.g., the mass of an object are true.”
I guess it depends on what you mean by “in a way more like”. Moral claims are pretty fundamentally different from physical claims, I don’t see how to get around that—one way to put it would be that the notions of right and wrong are not inductive generalizations over observed phenomena—another way to put it would be that the question “what does it mean for something to be right or wrong” is meaningless, the only meaningful question is “what do we mean when we say that something is right or wrong” (to which the answer is “we do not mean anything, rather we speak to advocate or condemn something”). But if you are just referring to some surface-level similarity like “neither of them is actually a secret way of referring to the speaker’s beliefs/opinions/values”, then sure.
Moral realists are going to differ with respect to what they think the metaphysical status of the moral facts are. Moral naturalists may see them roughly as a kind of natural fact, so moral facts might be facts about e.g., increases in wellbeing, while non-naturalists would maintain that moral facts aren’t reducible to natural facts.