You don’t need to be a moral realist to be swayed by arguments from logical consistency. If I say “I regard animals as moral patients and therefore won’t eat them, but I do eat fish and chicken” then pointing out my inconsistency has much the same force whether I’m a moral realist who thinks “animals have moral importance” is a fact about the universe or a moral nonrealist for whom it’s a fact about my values.
Arguments that actually work are the kind that are based on widely accepted principles.
What matters isn’t whether a principle is widely accepted, it’s whether it’s accepted by the person you’re arguing with. And, again, what matters is whether you can find such principles to base your argument on, not whether the person you’re arguing with thinks those principles are matters of objective fact.
(“You shouldn’t eat that because it’s got lots of beetroot in it and you hate beetroot” is a strong argument even if the person you’re making it at isn’t a gastronomic realist. Similarly, “You shouldn’t do that because it would mean X and you regard X as morally bad” is a strong argument even if the person you’re making it at isn’t a moral realist.)
You can be a utilitarian and a realist, as well.
Of course! I thought that was obvious and I wasn’t in the least intending to suggest otherwise.
There’s very little difference in that distinction [sc. between dismissing something and disagreeing with it].
I completely disagree. Dismissing something is justified much less often than disagreeing with it; it’s often true to say “you can’t just dismiss X” but false to say “you can’t disagree with X”.
There can be truths about human constructs, e.g. Engineering, Economics.
Perhaps I misunderstood you, before. I thought you were talking about constructing an ethical system. The equivalent of that in engineering would be constructing a set of physical laws, but that’s not what anyone does when determining truths about human constructs in the realm of engineering; when an engineer says “if you build the bridge that way then it will fall down”, they mean it will fall down because that’s how the universe actually works, not only that we have invented a system of physical laws according to which the bridge will fall down.
Lack of universalism does not imply lack of realism.
Fair enough. But what you wrote does seem to me flagrantly non-realist, not merely non-universal.
It is not nihilism, or anything-goes subjectivism either.
Indeed it isn’t. But I thought you were making a claim stronger than “nihilism is bad”, and saying specifically that moral realism is necessary in order for there to be any point in engaging in moral arguments. Maybe you weren’t. You’ve talked about “relativism” and “subjectivism” and (non)”realism” and not been terribly clear about what distinctions, if any, you make between those terms; perhaps all along you were saying only “nihilism is bad” and this whole argument has been a waste of time.
If you think there is an actual disagreement here, then I beg you to do the thing I asked you to three years ago upthread: describe an actual concrete situation in which some moral argument should move a moral realist but there’s no closely-equivalent argument that should have the same effect on someone who has the same moral values but isn’t realist about them.
I think that if a moral argument moves someone it’s by appealing to specific moral values they have, and that this will work equally well whether they are realist about those values or not.
You don’t need to be a moral realist to be swayed by arguments from logical consistency. If I say “I regard animals as moral patients and therefore won’t eat them, but I do eat fish and chicken” then pointing out my inconsistency has much the same force whether I’m a moral realist who thinks “animals have moral importance” is a fact about the universe or a moral nonrealist for whom it’s a fact about my value
Such arguments could be realist arguments, even if the person hearing them doesn’t label themselves a realist.
What matters isn’t whether a principle is widely accepted, it’s whether it’s accepted by the person you’re arguing with
What matters for the purpose of this argument is what works better in general, because the point is that MR needs to be constructed if it doesn’t pre exist.
. I thought you were talking about constructing an ethical system. The equivalent of that in engineering would be constructing a set of physical laws
No, engineers get physical laws from phsyiscists. Engineering principles are tied to an end in a way that physics isn’t …you don’t engineer a sportscar the same as a haulage truck.
when an engineer says “if you build the bridge that way then it will fall down”, they mean it will fall down because that’s how the universe actually works, not only that we have invented a system of physical laws according to which the bridge will fall down.
It will fall.down because it is not following the right engineering principles, which are based on, but not wholly derivable from , the laws of physics. They are not wholly derivable because you need to know what you are aiming at it.
But what you wrote does seem to me flagrantly non-realist, not merely non-universal.
Does it seem relativist or subjectivist?
But I thought you were making a claim stronger than “nihilism is bad”, and saying specifically that moral realism is necessary in order for there to be any point in engaging in moral arguments
Constructivism, as I have outlined it, can give a point as well. I am not claiming full strength realism.
Maybe you weren’t. You’ve talked about “relativism” and “subjectivism” and (non)”realism” and not been terribly clear about what distinctions, if any, you make between those terms
There are a lot of possible positions, no way I can explain all of them from scratch, and no need to, since reference material is available. Read
If you think there is an actual disagreement here, then I beg you to do the thing I asked you to three years ago upthread: describe an actual concrete situation in which some moral argument should move a moral realist but there’s no closely-equivalent argument that should have the same effect on someone who has the same moral values but isn’t realist about them
You keep assuming that I am defending Platonic realism, when I have said that I am not. I never said that values are real (or that morality is primarily about object level values). I said:-
The apparent requirement for supernatural entities is a common reason to reject MR, but many naturalist theories of realism are available. Eg evolutionary ethics, contractarianism, Kantian ethics and game theoretical ethics. Maybe utilitarianism as well.
Realism of the kind I.stalking about isn’t some weird thing that’s different from everything else. Logic, maths and game theory are objective. So someone who already accepts logical principles like “inconsistent things are wrong” and game theoretic principles such as “people are more likely to co operate with me if I cooperate with them”—and many people do—is already in a position where they can accept the kind of realist , or quasi realist, arguments I am stalking about. And many real-world examples.of mass persuasion—where a whole society has shifted—work that way.
Subjectivism can’t account for convergence , or global shifts, since any successful attempt by A to convince B can be cancelled out by some C convincing some D in the opposite direction.
Kinds of moral realism that depend on weird metaphysics aren’t going to successful in mass persuasion either. So that’s not what I.am.talking about.
You don’t need to be a moral realist to be swayed by arguments from logical consistency. If I say “I regard animals as moral patients and therefore won’t eat them, but I do eat fish and chicken” then pointing out my inconsistency has much the same force whether I’m a moral realist who thinks “animals have moral importance” is a fact about the universe or a moral nonrealist for whom it’s a fact about my values.
What matters isn’t whether a principle is widely accepted, it’s whether it’s accepted by the person you’re arguing with. And, again, what matters is whether you can find such principles to base your argument on, not whether the person you’re arguing with thinks those principles are matters of objective fact.
(“You shouldn’t eat that because it’s got lots of beetroot in it and you hate beetroot” is a strong argument even if the person you’re making it at isn’t a gastronomic realist. Similarly, “You shouldn’t do that because it would mean X and you regard X as morally bad” is a strong argument even if the person you’re making it at isn’t a moral realist.)
Of course! I thought that was obvious and I wasn’t in the least intending to suggest otherwise.
I completely disagree. Dismissing something is justified much less often than disagreeing with it; it’s often true to say “you can’t just dismiss X” but false to say “you can’t disagree with X”.
Perhaps I misunderstood you, before. I thought you were talking about constructing an ethical system. The equivalent of that in engineering would be constructing a set of physical laws, but that’s not what anyone does when determining truths about human constructs in the realm of engineering; when an engineer says “if you build the bridge that way then it will fall down”, they mean it will fall down because that’s how the universe actually works, not only that we have invented a system of physical laws according to which the bridge will fall down.
Fair enough. But what you wrote does seem to me flagrantly non-realist, not merely non-universal.
Indeed it isn’t. But I thought you were making a claim stronger than “nihilism is bad”, and saying specifically that moral realism is necessary in order for there to be any point in engaging in moral arguments. Maybe you weren’t. You’ve talked about “relativism” and “subjectivism” and (non)”realism” and not been terribly clear about what distinctions, if any, you make between those terms; perhaps all along you were saying only “nihilism is bad” and this whole argument has been a waste of time.
If you think there is an actual disagreement here, then I beg you to do the thing I asked you to three years ago upthread: describe an actual concrete situation in which some moral argument should move a moral realist but there’s no closely-equivalent argument that should have the same effect on someone who has the same moral values but isn’t realist about them.
I think that if a moral argument moves someone it’s by appealing to specific moral values they have, and that this will work equally well whether they are realist about those values or not.
Such arguments could be realist arguments, even if the person hearing them doesn’t label themselves a realist.
What matters for the purpose of this argument is what works better in general, because the point is that MR needs to be constructed if it doesn’t pre exist.
No, engineers get physical laws from phsyiscists. Engineering principles are tied to an end in a way that physics isn’t …you don’t engineer a sportscar the same as a haulage truck.
It will fall.down because it is not following the right engineering principles, which are based on, but not wholly derivable from , the laws of physics. They are not wholly derivable because you need to know what you are aiming at it.
Does it seem relativist or subjectivist?
Constructivism, as I have outlined it, can give a point as well. I am not claiming full strength realism.
There are a lot of possible positions, no way I can explain all of them from scratch, and no need to, since reference material is available. Read
You keep assuming that I am defending Platonic realism, when I have said that I am not. I never said that values are real (or that morality is primarily about object level values). I said:-
Realism of the kind I.stalking about isn’t some weird thing that’s different from everything else. Logic, maths and game theory are objective. So someone who already accepts logical principles like “inconsistent things are wrong” and game theoretic principles such as “people are more likely to co operate with me if I cooperate with them”—and many people do—is already in a position where they can accept the kind of realist , or quasi realist, arguments I am stalking about. And many real-world examples.of mass persuasion—where a whole society has shifted—work that way.
Subjectivism can’t account for convergence , or global shifts, since any successful attempt by A to convince B can be cancelled out by some C convincing some D in the opposite direction.
Kinds of moral realism that depend on weird metaphysics aren’t going to successful in mass persuasion either. So that’s not what I.am.talking about.