This was obviously not the extent of my argument for phenomenal conservatism.
What was wrong with the classification of anti-realists? If one is a realist they think that there are mind independent moral facts. Thus, to deny this, one needs to think either moral claims aren’t truth apt, they’re all false, or they depend on attitudes. I’ve read Eliezer’s stuff about morality, FWIW. If you want my ideological turing test of at least one version of anti-realism, here it is https://benthams.substack.com/p/sounding-like-an-anti-realist
Yes—though the predictions won’t settle it. Some things we’d predict of aliens is that they’d appreciate pleasure if they can experience it, that some of them would be utilitarians, and we’d also predict greater moral convergence over time. In particular, we’d expect a coherent formula to be able to characterize the moral views that are supported by the most reasons. I think if none of those things ended up being true, my credence in realism would decrease to around 60%.
Thus, to deny this, one needs to think either moral claims aren’t truth apt, they’re all false, or they depend on attitudes.
No they don’t. The standard claim that all antirealist positions are either relativism, error theory, or noncognitivism is false: it requires antirealist positions to include a semantic claim about the meaning of moral claims.
But an antirealist can both deny that there are stance-independent moral facts, and deny the philosophical presuppositions implicit in the claim that there is some kind of correct analysis of moral claims, such that moral claims are either truth apt, all false, or depend on attitudes. Also, an antirealist can endorse indeterminacy about the meaning of moral claims, and maintain that they aren’t determinately truth-apt, false, or dependent on attitudes. For an example, see:
Gill, M. B. (2009). Indeterminacy and variability in meta-ethics. Philosophical studies, 145(2), 215-234.
I agree with this—one can think some claims aren’t truth apt, others false, others dependent on attitudes. The claim is that collectively these have to cover all moral claims.
I’m explicitly denying that that covers all the possibilities. You can also endorse incoherentism or indeterminacy.
Also, when you say that the claims aren’t truth-apt, are you supposing that the claims themselves have a meaning, or that the person who made the claim means to communicate something with a given moral utterance?
What was wrong with the classification of anti-realists?
Where would “Morality as fixed computation” fit in your typology? Or metaethical constructivism? Like, it’s fine to dunk on error theorists or relativists all you want, but it’s not real relevant to LW. Individual subjectivism is sort of closer, but I would have liked to see a typology that included things LWers might actually endorse.
As another example of something not fitting in your typology, consider the rules of baseball. We all agree baseball is socially constructed—it’s not trying to conform to some Platonic ideal, the rules could easily have been different, they arose through some social process, etc. And yet facts about baseball are also pretty solid—it’s not a matter of opinion whether it takes three strikes or four to get a batter out.
You might say that baseball is in fact culturally relativist. After all, society came up with the rules of baseball in the first place, and has agreed to change the rules of baseball before.
But suppose the Nazis had won the war, and in this alternate history they forced everyone to play baseball with a large ball filled with air, and there was no pitcher or batters, instead you gained points by getting the ball through a goal guarded by the opposing team, and you weren’t allowed to touch the ball with your arms. It should seem obvious that what is going on is not that the Nazis made it true that “in baseball you kick the ball with your feet.” All they did was outlaw baseball entirely, and force everyone to play soccer football. When the alternate-reality Nazis say “Baseball is played with eleven players on a side,” they’re simply not talking about baseball. So is baseball non-cognitivist, because the Nazis’ statements aren’t actually about the thing they syntactically seem to be about? But again, when you talk about baseball, you’re capable of making perfectly good true or false statements.
Where would “Morality as fixed computation” fit in your typology?
Failing to address most of the issues. Theres nothing about whether everyone has the same computation , and there’s nothing about how to resolve conflicts, if they don’t. There’s also nothing about obligation or punishment....
Thanks for the reply and kind words!
This was obviously not the extent of my argument for phenomenal conservatism.
What was wrong with the classification of anti-realists? If one is a realist they think that there are mind independent moral facts. Thus, to deny this, one needs to think either moral claims aren’t truth apt, they’re all false, or they depend on attitudes. I’ve read Eliezer’s stuff about morality, FWIW. If you want my ideological turing test of at least one version of anti-realism, here it is https://benthams.substack.com/p/sounding-like-an-anti-realist
Yes—though the predictions won’t settle it. Some things we’d predict of aliens is that they’d appreciate pleasure if they can experience it, that some of them would be utilitarians, and we’d also predict greater moral convergence over time. In particular, we’d expect a coherent formula to be able to characterize the moral views that are supported by the most reasons. I think if none of those things ended up being true, my credence in realism would decrease to around 60%.
No they don’t. The standard claim that all antirealist positions are either relativism, error theory, or noncognitivism is false: it requires antirealist positions to include a semantic claim about the meaning of moral claims.
But an antirealist can both deny that there are stance-independent moral facts, and deny the philosophical presuppositions implicit in the claim that there is some kind of correct analysis of moral claims, such that moral claims are either truth apt, all false, or depend on attitudes. Also, an antirealist can endorse indeterminacy about the meaning of moral claims, and maintain that they aren’t determinately truth-apt, false, or dependent on attitudes. For an example, see:
Gill, M. B. (2009). Indeterminacy and variability in meta-ethics. Philosophical studies, 145(2), 215-234.
I agree with this—one can think some claims aren’t truth apt, others false, others dependent on attitudes. The claim is that collectively these have to cover all moral claims.
I’m explicitly denying that that covers all the possibilities. You can also endorse incoherentism or indeterminacy.
Also, when you say that the claims aren’t truth-apt, are you supposing that the claims themselves have a meaning, or that the person who made the claim means to communicate something with a given moral utterance?
Where would “Morality as fixed computation” fit in your typology? Or metaethical constructivism? Like, it’s fine to dunk on error theorists or relativists all you want, but it’s not real relevant to LW. Individual subjectivism is sort of closer, but I would have liked to see a typology that included things LWers might actually endorse.
As another example of something not fitting in your typology, consider the rules of baseball. We all agree baseball is socially constructed—it’s not trying to conform to some Platonic ideal, the rules could easily have been different, they arose through some social process, etc. And yet facts about baseball are also pretty solid—it’s not a matter of opinion whether it takes three strikes or four to get a batter out.
You might say that baseball is in fact culturally relativist. After all, society came up with the rules of baseball in the first place, and has agreed to change the rules of baseball before.
But suppose the Nazis had won the war, and in this alternate history they forced everyone to play baseball with a large ball filled with air, and there was no pitcher or batters, instead you gained points by getting the ball through a goal guarded by the opposing team, and you weren’t allowed to touch the ball with your arms. It should seem obvious that what is going on is not that the Nazis made it true that “in baseball you kick the ball with your feet.” All they did was outlaw baseball entirely, and force everyone to play
soccerfootball. When the alternate-reality Nazis say “Baseball is played with eleven players on a side,” they’re simply not talking about baseball. So is baseball non-cognitivist, because the Nazis’ statements aren’t actually about the thing they syntactically seem to be about? But again, when you talk about baseball, you’re capable of making perfectly good true or false statements.Probably some type of relativism.
Failing to address most of the issues. Theres nothing about whether everyone has the same computation , and there’s nothing about how to resolve conflicts, if they don’t. There’s also nothing about obligation or punishment....
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/FnJPa8E9ZG5xiLLp5/morality-as-fixed-computation