I think your definition of consequentialism (and deontology) is too broad because it makes some contractarian theories consequentialist. In “Equality,” Nagel argues that the rightness of an act is determined by the acceptability of its consequences for those to whom they are most unacceptable. This is similar to Rawls’s view that inequalities are morally permissible if they result in a net-benefit to the most disadvantaged members of society. These views are definitely deontological (and self-labeled as such), and since consequentialism and deontology are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, they are non-consequentialist. But since they determine the rightness of an act by its consequences, they would be considered forms of consequentialism under your definition; thus, your definition cannot be correct.
My counter-interpretation of consequentialism would be this:
An act is morally permissible if it (or if its rule, under RC) yields results that are maximally good. (This comes from Vallentyne, “Consequentialism.”)
Deontology is the belief that something can be morally permissible even if it does not promote the best consequences. This may be due to options, special relationships, constraints, agent-relative values, or something altogether different.
This definition makes the two theories mutually exclusive and exhaustive, and it puts contractarian views like Rawls’s and Nagel’s where they belong.
Rawls’s view that inequalities are morally permissible if they result in a net-benefit to the most disadvantaged members of society.
I haven’t made a close study of Rawls, but what I know inclines me towards an interpretation under which the difference principle is a prediction about what agents would agree to behind the veil of ignorance, and only via their agreeing upon it does it gain moral force.
consequentialism and deontology are mutually exclusive and exhaustive
I don’t think they are necessarily either of these things. You can have considerable overlap—even doppelgangers blur the lines—and you’re neglecting virtue ethics, which doesn’t have a clear allegiance with either.
n act is morally permissible if it (or if its rule, under RC) yields results that are maximally good.
This neglects satisficing theories, and (depending on how strict you mean this to be) theories that talk about things other than acts or rules.
Deontology is the belief that something can be morally permissible even if it does not promote the best consequences.
Defining deontology in terms of consequentialism is something I’d like to avoid.
I think your definition of consequentialism (and deontology) is too broad because it makes some contractarian theories consequentialist. In “Equality,” Nagel argues that the rightness of an act is determined by the acceptability of its consequences for those to whom they are most unacceptable. This is similar to Rawls’s view that inequalities are morally permissible if they result in a net-benefit to the most disadvantaged members of society. These views are definitely deontological (and self-labeled as such), and since consequentialism and deontology are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, they are non-consequentialist. But since they determine the rightness of an act by its consequences, they would be considered forms of consequentialism under your definition; thus, your definition cannot be correct.
My counter-interpretation of consequentialism would be this: An act is morally permissible if it (or if its rule, under RC) yields results that are maximally good. (This comes from Vallentyne, “Consequentialism.”) Deontology is the belief that something can be morally permissible even if it does not promote the best consequences. This may be due to options, special relationships, constraints, agent-relative values, or something altogether different. This definition makes the two theories mutually exclusive and exhaustive, and it puts contractarian views like Rawls’s and Nagel’s where they belong.
I haven’t made a close study of Rawls, but what I know inclines me towards an interpretation under which the difference principle is a prediction about what agents would agree to behind the veil of ignorance, and only via their agreeing upon it does it gain moral force.
I don’t think they are necessarily either of these things. You can have considerable overlap—even doppelgangers blur the lines—and you’re neglecting virtue ethics, which doesn’t have a clear allegiance with either.
This neglects satisficing theories, and (depending on how strict you mean this to be) theories that talk about things other than acts or rules.
Defining deontology in terms of consequentialism is something I’d like to avoid.