So if they want to retain without interruption their right to, say, not have a symmetrical spherical stone at the edge of their lawn rotated without permission, they perforce care whether or not it is rotated? They can’t merely want a right? Or if they want a right, and have a right, and they don’t care to exercise the right, but want to retain the right, they can’t? What if the only reason they care to prohibit stone turning is to retain the right? Does that work? Is there a special rule saying it doesn’t?
As part of testing theories to see when they fail rather than succeed, my first move is usually to try recursion.
Regardless, you seem to believe that some other forms of deontology are wrong but not illogical, and believe consequentialist theories wrong or illogical. For example, a deontology otherwise like yours that valued attentiveness to evidence more you would label wrong and not illogical. I ask if you would consider a deontological theory invalid if it ignored wants, cares etc. of beings, not whether or not that is part of your theory.
If it’s not illogical and merely wrong, then is that to say you count that among the theories that may be true, if you are mistaken about facts, but not mistaken about what is illogical and not?
I think such a dentology would be illogical, but am to various degrees unsure about other theories, which is right and which wrong, and about the severity and number of wounds in the wrong ones. Because this deontology seems illogical, it makes me suspect of its cousin theories, as it might be a salient case exhibiting a common flaw.
I think it is more intellectually troubling than the hypothetical of committing a small badness to prevent a larger one, but as it is rarely raised presumably others disagree or have different intuitions.
I don’t see the point of mucking with the English language and causing confusion for the sake of feminism if the end result is that singular sample murderers are gendered. It seems like the worst of both worlds.
I don’t think people have the silly right you have described.
I don’t think your attempt at “recursion” is useful unless you are interested in rigorously defining “want” and “care” and any other words you are tempted to employ in that capacity.
I don’t think I have drawn on an especially convenient possible world.
I don’t think you’re reading me charitably, or accurately.
I don’t think you’re predicting my dispositions correctly.
I don’t think you’re using the words “invalid” or “illogical” to refer to anything I’m accustomed to using the words for.
I don’t think you make very much sense.
I don’t think I consulted you, or solicited your opinion about, my use of pronouns.
I don’t think you’re initiating this conversation in good faith.
I’m sorry you feel that way. I tried to be upfront about my positions that you would disfavor: a form of feminism and also deontology. Perhaps you interpreted as egregious malicious emphasis on differences what I intended as the opposite.
Also, I think what you’re interpreting as predicting dispositions wrongly is what I see as trying to spell out all possible objections as a way to have a conversation with you, rather than a debate in which the truth falls out of an argument. That means I raise objections that we might anticipate someone with a different system would raise, rather than setting up to clash with you.
I think that when you say I am not reading you charitably or accurately, you have taken what was a very reasonable misreading of my first comment and failed to update based on my second. I’m not talking about your theory. I’m trying to ask how fundamental the problems are in a somewhat related theory. Whether your theory escapes its gravity well of wrongness depends on both the distance from the mass of doom and its size. I hope that analogy was clear, as apparently other stuff hasn’t been. So you can probably imagine what I think, as it somewhat mirrors what you seem to think: you’re not reading me charitably, accurately, etc. I know you’re not innately evil, of course, that’s obvious and foundational to communication.
So if they want to retain without interruption their right to, say, not have a symmetrical spherical stone at the edge of their lawn rotated without permission, they perforce care whether or not it is rotated? They can’t merely want a right? Or if they want a right, and have a right, and they don’t care to exercise the right, but want to retain the right, they can’t? What if the only reason they care to prohibit stone turning is to retain the right? Does that work? Is there a special rule saying it doesn’t?
As part of testing theories to see when they fail rather than succeed, my first move is usually to try recursion.
Least convenient possible world, please.
Regardless, you seem to believe that some other forms of deontology are wrong but not illogical, and believe consequentialist theories wrong or illogical. For example, a deontology otherwise like yours that valued attentiveness to evidence more you would label wrong and not illogical. I ask if you would consider a deontological theory invalid if it ignored wants, cares etc. of beings, not whether or not that is part of your theory.
If it’s not illogical and merely wrong, then is that to say you count that among the theories that may be true, if you are mistaken about facts, but not mistaken about what is illogical and not?
I think such a dentology would be illogical, but am to various degrees unsure about other theories, which is right and which wrong, and about the severity and number of wounds in the wrong ones. Because this deontology seems illogical, it makes me suspect of its cousin theories, as it might be a salient case exhibiting a common flaw.
I think it is more intellectually troubling than the hypothetical of committing a small badness to prevent a larger one, but as it is rarely raised presumably others disagree or have different intuitions.
I don’t see the point of mucking with the English language and causing confusion for the sake of feminism if the end result is that singular sample murderers are gendered. It seems like the worst of both worlds.
I don’t think people have the silly right you have described.
I don’t think your attempt at “recursion” is useful unless you are interested in rigorously defining “want” and “care” and any other words you are tempted to employ in that capacity.
I don’t think I have drawn on an especially convenient possible world.
I don’t think you’re reading me charitably, or accurately.
I don’t think you’re predicting my dispositions correctly.
I don’t think you’re using the words “invalid” or “illogical” to refer to anything I’m accustomed to using the words for.
I don’t think you make very much sense.
I don’t think I consulted you, or solicited your opinion about, my use of pronouns.
I don’t think you’re initiating this conversation in good faith.
I’m sorry you feel that way. I tried to be upfront about my positions that you would disfavor: a form of feminism and also deontology. Perhaps you interpreted as egregious malicious emphasis on differences what I intended as the opposite.
Also, I think what you’re interpreting as predicting dispositions wrongly is what I see as trying to spell out all possible objections as a way to have a conversation with you, rather than a debate in which the truth falls out of an argument. That means I raise objections that we might anticipate someone with a different system would raise, rather than setting up to clash with you.
I think that when you say I am not reading you charitably or accurately, you have taken what was a very reasonable misreading of my first comment and failed to update based on my second. I’m not talking about your theory. I’m trying to ask how fundamental the problems are in a somewhat related theory. Whether your theory escapes its gravity well of wrongness depends on both the distance from the mass of doom and its size. I hope that analogy was clear, as apparently other stuff hasn’t been. So you can probably imagine what I think, as it somewhat mirrors what you seem to think: you’re not reading me charitably, accurately, etc. I know you’re not innately evil, of course, that’s obvious and foundational to communication.
I am exiting this conversation now. I believe it will net no good.