So it’s not that this guy’s lie is a case of some more general act ‘lying’ which involves a contradiction. Rather, the maxim which describes this specific action cannot be understood as a universal law. That doesn’t make the action in any way contradictory. In fact, it’s a neat fulfillment of the demands of self-love. The point is that the agent is incapable, once he reflects on his action, of thinking of the action as one prescribed entirely by reason, because reason always speaks in universals, and this action cannot be understood as a case of a universal. Edit: To clarify, Kant’s point isn’t that this example is a case of a more general kind which is wrong, his point is that the lie is wrong because there’s no more general kind of rational action (which is to say, action, full stop) to which it can belong.
I’m having a hard time seeing this as distinct. It seems to me that the phrase “the maxim which describes this specific action cannot be understood as a universal law” is just a more vague rephrasing of the idea that “this guy’s lie is a case of some more general act ‘lying’ which involves a contradiction”. I agree that his argument is that the specific action can’t be understood as a universal law, but the idea of how we go about translating specific actions into universal laws to me seems to implicitly depend upon the idea that “this guy’s lie is a case of some more general act ‘lying’”. I don’t understand what universal law Kant is rejecting if not the universal law of lying.
Edit: I think the idea of mocking or ridiculing some idea or thinker should be met with extreme suspicion, and I think Nietzsche would probably even agree with me on that. Laughing at Kant is a way of not thinking about Kant. For Nietzsche, it was important that we be capable of just not thinking about some things, but we do so at the risk of just laughing everything off, even stuff we should be thinking about. And laughing has no internal limits, no little alarm that goes off when you laugh off something important.
Nietzsche explicitly laughs at Kant’s Categorical Imperative in the text I quoted. Laughing at things is fun, although I’ll agree it leads to dismissal. So, wait to laugh at an idea until after you’ve heard it out, and then have all the fun with it you want. I think that would be a fine solution. The alternative is to not laugh at bad arguments, and that sort of leads to despairing at the stupidity of the masses, I think.
I agree that his argument is that the specific action can’t be understood as a universal law, but the idea of how we go about translating specific actions into universal laws to me seems to implicitly depend upon the idea that “this guy’s lie is a case of some more general act ‘lying’”. I don’t understand what universal law Kant is rejecting if not the universal law of lying.
I don’t think your description is off the mark, but I do think this sets it apart from the worst argument in the world. if Kant were making the worst argument in the world, his claim would be that this man’s action is a lie, and that because some lies are bad or contradictory, this lie must be as well. But Kant doesn’t appeal to 1) a general action type, or 2) any other particular cases of actions similar to this one.
I take (2) to be obvious from the text, so I’ll just defend (1). The maxim of an action is not a general action type, but the law or rule of which some action is a case. So we have three things: the particular case of lying, the general action-type of lying, and the rule of which this particular case is a case. It may (or may not) be true that all cases of lying, and thus the action-type as a whole, fall under the same rule that this particular case falls under. This wouldn’t matter to Kant’s argument, since he only appeals to the rule under which this particular action falls. Notice that the maxim described in his argument doesn’t come close to being a rule for all cases of lying. It’s only intended to be a rule for this specific case.
I think that you think that Kant thinks that action-types are defined by maxims, such that a lie is wrong because it falls under the action-type ‘lying’ which is defined by such and such a maxim. But this can’t be right, because Kant’s whole point is that the lie he’s discussing, on reflection, simply has no maxim. It only seems to. Thus it cannot be the result of reason alone, and we can only explain the action in terms of a heteronomous will (a will governed by many conflicting interests, which he goes on to discuss at the end of chapter 2 and 3). So even if action types were defined by maxims, there wouldn’t be an action type for lying to fall under, because it has no maxim.
I’m having a hard time seeing this as distinct. It seems to me that the phrase “the maxim which describes this specific action cannot be understood as a universal law” is just a more vague rephrasing of the idea that “this guy’s lie is a case of some more general act ‘lying’ which involves a contradiction”. I agree that his argument is that the specific action can’t be understood as a universal law, but the idea of how we go about translating specific actions into universal laws to me seems to implicitly depend upon the idea that “this guy’s lie is a case of some more general act ‘lying’”. I don’t understand what universal law Kant is rejecting if not the universal law of lying.
Nietzsche explicitly laughs at Kant’s Categorical Imperative in the text I quoted. Laughing at things is fun, although I’ll agree it leads to dismissal. So, wait to laugh at an idea until after you’ve heard it out, and then have all the fun with it you want. I think that would be a fine solution. The alternative is to not laugh at bad arguments, and that sort of leads to despairing at the stupidity of the masses, I think.
I don’t think your description is off the mark, but I do think this sets it apart from the worst argument in the world. if Kant were making the worst argument in the world, his claim would be that this man’s action is a lie, and that because some lies are bad or contradictory, this lie must be as well. But Kant doesn’t appeal to 1) a general action type, or 2) any other particular cases of actions similar to this one.
I take (2) to be obvious from the text, so I’ll just defend (1). The maxim of an action is not a general action type, but the law or rule of which some action is a case. So we have three things: the particular case of lying, the general action-type of lying, and the rule of which this particular case is a case. It may (or may not) be true that all cases of lying, and thus the action-type as a whole, fall under the same rule that this particular case falls under. This wouldn’t matter to Kant’s argument, since he only appeals to the rule under which this particular action falls. Notice that the maxim described in his argument doesn’t come close to being a rule for all cases of lying. It’s only intended to be a rule for this specific case.
I think that you think that Kant thinks that action-types are defined by maxims, such that a lie is wrong because it falls under the action-type ‘lying’ which is defined by such and such a maxim. But this can’t be right, because Kant’s whole point is that the lie he’s discussing, on reflection, simply has no maxim. It only seems to. Thus it cannot be the result of reason alone, and we can only explain the action in terms of a heteronomous will (a will governed by many conflicting interests, which he goes on to discuss at the end of chapter 2 and 3). So even if action types were defined by maxims, there wouldn’t be an action type for lying to fall under, because it has no maxim.
Okay, I misinterpreted Kant, thanks for the correction!
Thanks for the interesting discussion.
You can think a the Categorical Imperative as a special case of updateless decision theory.