the argument that popular science mischaracterizes things for the worse.
Respectfully, I think this is the feminist argument.
There obvious are morally relevant differences between men and women (e.g. pregnancy). The open question is whether they require or even justify our current gender roles.
Ability to get pregnant is not, even now, a difference between men and women. Lots of women can’t, and some men can. Many feminists argue that there are circumstances where pregnancy/ability to get pregnant/desire to get pregnant are relevant and justify different treatment, but that we should ignore the correlation with gender.
Ability to get pregnant is not, even now, a difference between men and women.
I reject some combination of your usage of “is”, “difference” or “men and woman” as impractical. I suggest that whatever kind of wordplay is used to make this claim could be used to make all sorts of utterly absurd claims that MixedNuts would reject as pure silliness and yet which are less objectively absurd than the claim in question.
but that we should ignore the correlation with gender.
Ignore the correlation with gender. Of pregnancy. That seems impractical. If I plan on becoming a father then I am most certainly going to direct my courtship attention to those who appear to be women while attempting to achieve that goal. Because being aware of correlations is overwhelmingly useful to me.
The relevant subargument here is: “Male psychology is deeply affected by inability to ever be pregnant, which makes it essentially different from female psychology” is false, because men who can and do get pregnant don’t have extraordinarily un-male psychology, they’re just more or less regular dudes plus a bun in the oven.
“Male psychology is deeply affected by inability to ever be pregnant, which makes it essentially different from female psychology” is false
That argument I would object to. There are probably differences in average male and female psychologies which have a causal history related to the ability to become pregnant—even ‘creepiness’ instincts are probably somewhat related. But that isn’t the same thing as pregnancy directly meaning the female and male psychologies different through knowing about pregnancy.
Hm. So, I would object to the line you quote, but mostly because I don’t have a clue what “essentially different” means. On the other hand, something like “Differences in how men and women get pregnant, and knowledge of and experiences that depend on those differences, is a significant source of between-group variance in the behavior of men and women” doesn’t strike me as objectionable at all. I mean, it might turn out to be false, but it seems to me a plausible belief in advance of experimental confirmation/rejection.
I acknowledge that the theoretical distinction between sex and gender is not universally accepted, but I think the distinction is incredibly useful. I’m talking about physical causes of gender roles, and it’s essentially impossible to deny that they exist. The fact that “able to get pregnant” != “woman” is irrelevant to my argument—and I reject any assertion that the exceptions deserve the negative moral judgments that society places on them.
If some feminists would like to totally ignore physical facts, I assert their political tactics are likely to be ineffective. In terms of outreach, acknowledging physical facts and dismissing their relevance is more effective than denying the physical facts exist.
Respectfully, I think this is the feminist argument.
There obvious are morally relevant differences between men and women (e.g. pregnancy). The open question is whether they require or even justify our current gender roles.
Ability to get pregnant is not, even now, a difference between men and women. Lots of women can’t, and some men can. Many feminists argue that there are circumstances where pregnancy/ability to get pregnant/desire to get pregnant are relevant and justify different treatment, but that we should ignore the correlation with gender.
I reject some combination of your usage of “is”, “difference” or “men and woman” as impractical. I suggest that whatever kind of wordplay is used to make this claim could be used to make all sorts of utterly absurd claims that MixedNuts would reject as pure silliness and yet which are less objectively absurd than the claim in question.
Ignore the correlation with gender. Of pregnancy. That seems impractical. If I plan on becoming a father then I am most certainly going to direct my courtship attention to those who appear to be women while attempting to achieve that goal. Because being aware of correlations is overwhelmingly useful to me.
The relevant subargument here is: “Male psychology is deeply affected by inability to ever be pregnant, which makes it essentially different from female psychology” is false, because men who can and do get pregnant don’t have extraordinarily un-male psychology, they’re just more or less regular dudes plus a bun in the oven.
That argument I would object to. There are probably differences in average male and female psychologies which have a causal history related to the ability to become pregnant—even ‘creepiness’ instincts are probably somewhat related. But that isn’t the same thing as pregnancy directly meaning the female and male psychologies different through knowing about pregnancy.
Hm.
So, I would object to the line you quote, but mostly because I don’t have a clue what “essentially different” means.
On the other hand, something like “Differences in how men and women get pregnant, and knowledge of and experiences that depend on those differences, is a significant source of between-group variance in the behavior of men and women” doesn’t strike me as objectionable at all. I mean, it might turn out to be false, but it seems to me a plausible belief in advance of experimental confirmation/rejection.
I’m not sure if we disagree on this.
I acknowledge that the theoretical distinction between sex and gender is not universally accepted, but I think the distinction is incredibly useful. I’m talking about physical causes of gender roles, and it’s essentially impossible to deny that they exist. The fact that “able to get pregnant” != “woman” is irrelevant to my argument—and I reject any assertion that the exceptions deserve the negative moral judgments that society places on them.
If some feminists would like to totally ignore physical facts, I assert their political tactics are likely to be ineffective. In terms of outreach, acknowledging physical facts and dismissing their relevance is more effective than denying the physical facts exist.