Compatibilism would hold that Omega can indeed be a perfect or near-perfect predictor. For those unfamiliar, compatibilism is the belief that we live in a determinstic world, but that doesn’t mean that we aren’t free. For instance, classical compatibilism holds that “freedom is nothing more than an agent’s ability to do what she wishes in the absence of impediments that would otherwise stand in her way,” (source) even if what an agent wishes is entirely causally determined by the physics in her brain. Even determinists can accept that agents can do things that they want to do!
The sort of free will that implies independence from a predictor would be “libertarian” free will, which only 4% of decision theorists believe in. That 4% cannot explain the overwhelming majority in favor of two-boxing.
Compatibilism can hold that free will is conditionally compatible with determinism , it doesn’t have to require belief in determinism.
More to the point, it’s possible to read the problem as implying a that the choice is free, in the libertarian senses so that they two boxer feels that assuming determinism fights the hypothesis. Of course the one boxer feels that failing to assume determinism is fighting the hypothesis. If the problem actually requires belief in both determinism and libertarianism, it doesn’t make sense. If it is unclear , it is unclear. Either way , the problem is flawed, not one of the answers.
In the same survey, decision theorists are as convinced of compatibilism as they are of two-boxing:
https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/4838?aos=1399
Compatibilism would hold that Omega can indeed be a perfect or near-perfect predictor. For those unfamiliar, compatibilism is the belief that we live in a determinstic world, but that doesn’t mean that we aren’t free. For instance, classical compatibilism holds that “freedom is nothing more than an agent’s ability to do what she wishes in the absence of impediments that would otherwise stand in her way,” (source) even if what an agent wishes is entirely causally determined by the physics in her brain. Even determinists can accept that agents can do things that they want to do!
The sort of free will that implies independence from a predictor would be “libertarian” free will, which only 4% of decision theorists believe in. That 4% cannot explain the overwhelming majority in favor of two-boxing.
Compatibilism can hold that free will is conditionally compatible with determinism , it doesn’t have to require belief in determinism.
More to the point, it’s possible to read the problem as implying a that the choice is free, in the libertarian senses so that they two boxer feels that assuming determinism fights the hypothesis. Of course the one boxer feels that failing to assume determinism is fighting the hypothesis. If the problem actually requires belief in both determinism and libertarianism, it doesn’t make sense. If it is unclear , it is unclear. Either way , the problem is flawed, not one of the answers.