every macroscopic state would have a defined designation as conscious or not [...] there would be no undefined states, per se
But the actual states of things are microscopic. And from a microscopic perspective, macroscopic states are vague. They have edge cases, they have sorites problems.
For crowds, or clouds, this doesn’t matter. That these are vague concepts does not create a philosophical crisis, because we have no reason to believe that there is an “essence of crowd” or “essence of cloud”, that is either present or not present, in every possible state of affairs.
Consciousness is different—it is definitely, actually there. As such, its relationship to the microphysical reality cannot be vague or conventional in nature. The relationship has to be exact.
The conscious system would be the one where, to take a common example, information has looped around and back to the same neuron, regardless of how exactly it did.
So by my criteria, the question is whether you can define informational states, and circulation of information, in such a way that from a microphysical perspective, there is never any ambiguity about whether they occurred. For all possible microphysical states, you should be able to say whether or not a given “informational state” is present. I’m not saying that every microphysical detail must contribute to consciousness; but if consciousness is to be identified with informational states, informational states have to have a fully objective existence.
But the actual states of things are microscopic. And from a microscopic perspective, macroscopic states are vague. They have edge cases, they have sorites problems.
For crowds, or clouds, this doesn’t matter. That these are vague concepts does not create a philosophical crisis, because we have no reason to believe that there is an “essence of crowd” or “essence of cloud”, that is either present or not present, in every possible state of affairs.
Consciousness is different—it is definitely, actually there. As such, its relationship to the microphysical reality cannot be vague or conventional in nature. The relationship has to be exact.
So by my criteria, the question is whether you can define informational states, and circulation of information, in such a way that from a microphysical perspective, there is never any ambiguity about whether they occurred. For all possible microphysical states, you should be able to say whether or not a given “informational state” is present. I’m not saying that every microphysical detail must contribute to consciousness; but if consciousness is to be identified with informational states, informational states have to have a fully objective existence.