I agree with this. However, there are philosophers who criticize this practice. For instance, Peter Unger recently published a vehement criticism of mainstream analytic philosophy, Empty Ideas.
One influential view is that we should not try to “analyze” pre-theoretical concepts, but rather construct fruitful, exact and simple “explications”. If you have that view, definitions do not become interesting for their own sake. Rather, terms and concepts are a tool in the pursuit of knowledge, which can be more or less effective. See Carnap’s dicussion in Logical Foundations of Probability, pp. 3-20 (esp. p. 7).
That said, it is true that many philosophers continue to write papers on the Gettier problem in a very classical essentialist fashion, along the lines you are describing. The same goes for many other philosophical discussions (e.g. on truth, reasons, etc).
I think that there is a selection effect at work here: those who think this is silly move on to other things while those who think that it isn’t keep on doing it. This creates the illusion that more people think this is a good and interesting form of philosophy than is actually the case.
Of course now and again some outsiders get so fed up with this that they write a book on it to attack it. Another similar example of this (in addition to Unger) is Ladyman and Ross’s attack on mainstream analytic metaphysics (which treats questions like “is the statue and the lump of clay that is made of distinct or identical objects?). I suspect that many others feel, however, that although this kind of philosophy is a bit of a nuisance, there are other more pressing problems more worth focusing on. For instance, I suspect Nick Bostrom doesn’t like this kind of philosophy, but as far as I know he hasn’t spent much time criticizing it, thinking there are other problems which are more important to spend time on.
Also, it seems surprisingly hard to weed out. The kind of criticism that Carnap gave is at least a century old, but the Gettier problem and other similar problems are still treated seriously.
An interesting argument for why people who are critical of this kind of philosophy should do something about it is, though, that it presents a great opportunity cost:
Why should something as “quixotic”, “mostly harmless”, and null as academic philosophy rouse any strong feelings whatsoever?
Because of the opportunity cost. Harmless-and-null philosophy is crowding out something better, and has been doing so since 1950 or so. Philosophy did not have to be what it is today; it was made what it is by purposeful, destructive action.
No, though I understand my comment could be read in that way. I have thought and read a lot about these questions (and written some things) and sometimes get a bit frustrated with them. I have started to become more pessimistic about the possibilities of convincing mainstream philosophers who like to work on these questions (“scholasticism with a dull knife”, as a brilliant colleague of mine scribbled on his noteblock during a talk on the Gettier problem).
Perhaps we should instead focus on showing what alternative things philosophers could do. Also we should make alliances with other subjects. People outside the discipline are much more likely to want to fund work on business ethics or medical ethics than yet another go at some concept or metaphysical question.
Without borrowing wholesale Kuhn’s picture of science, I think some ideas Kuhn introduced are important to keep in mind when considering the trajectory of philosophy. Research programs are adopted, consciously or not, by a certain part of the philosophical community: certain tenets are taken for granted, certain notions are regarded as the proper ones to use as tools, and certain puzzles are regarded as the ones to focus attention on. The research program isn’t abandoned simply on the ground that seemingly compelling arguments against its fundamental assumptions are presented. Rather, it is abandoned when research conducted within its confines is no longer seen as fruitful, and when a new alternative, with some promise of success, is available.
If we can’t disprove the Gettier stuff, perhaps we can hope that people will get bored of it (if we provide them with a less boring alternative).
If we can’t disprove the Gettier stuff, perhaps we can hope that people will get bored of it (if we provide them with a less boring alternative).
When you can’t disprove something the straightforward way is to accept it. In this case you can switch to a more construtivist notion of knowledge. To quote Heinz von Förster: “Truth is the invention of a liar.”
Perhaps we should instead focus on showing what alternative things philosophers could do. Also we should make alliances with other subjects. People outside the discipline are much more likely to want to fund work on business ethics or medical ethics than yet another go at some concept or metaphysical question.
The problem isn’t that you can’t do anything useful with ontology but that a lot of analytic philosophers are confused about the subject and produce papers that provide no value.
Barry Smith does deal with the question of knowledge and get’s funded because he actually does something useful. Applied ontology is useful for bioinformatics and other fields likely also would profit from it.
It possible that in one or two decades bioinformatic inspired mapping of mental states is good enough that the psychology folks with their DSM simply loses it’s authority.
I agree with this. However, there are philosophers who criticize this practice. For instance, Peter Unger recently published a vehement criticism of mainstream analytic philosophy, Empty Ideas.
One influential view is that we should not try to “analyze” pre-theoretical concepts, but rather construct fruitful, exact and simple “explications”. If you have that view, definitions do not become interesting for their own sake. Rather, terms and concepts are a tool in the pursuit of knowledge, which can be more or less effective. See Carnap’s dicussion in Logical Foundations of Probability, pp. 3-20 (esp. p. 7).
That said, it is true that many philosophers continue to write papers on the Gettier problem in a very classical essentialist fashion, along the lines you are describing. The same goes for many other philosophical discussions (e.g. on truth, reasons, etc).
I think that there is a selection effect at work here: those who think this is silly move on to other things while those who think that it isn’t keep on doing it. This creates the illusion that more people think this is a good and interesting form of philosophy than is actually the case.
Of course now and again some outsiders get so fed up with this that they write a book on it to attack it. Another similar example of this (in addition to Unger) is Ladyman and Ross’s attack on mainstream analytic metaphysics (which treats questions like “is the statue and the lump of clay that is made of distinct or identical objects?). I suspect that many others feel, however, that although this kind of philosophy is a bit of a nuisance, there are other more pressing problems more worth focusing on. For instance, I suspect Nick Bostrom doesn’t like this kind of philosophy, but as far as I know he hasn’t spent much time criticizing it, thinking there are other problems which are more important to spend time on.
Also, it seems surprisingly hard to weed out. The kind of criticism that Carnap gave is at least a century old, but the Gettier problem and other similar problems are still treated seriously.
An interesting argument for why people who are critical of this kind of philosophy should do something about it is, though, that it presents a great opportunity cost:
Do you think the question whether or not core foundations of analytical philosophy are correct is unimportant?
No, though I understand my comment could be read in that way. I have thought and read a lot about these questions (and written some things) and sometimes get a bit frustrated with them. I have started to become more pessimistic about the possibilities of convincing mainstream philosophers who like to work on these questions (“scholasticism with a dull knife”, as a brilliant colleague of mine scribbled on his noteblock during a talk on the Gettier problem).
Perhaps we should instead focus on showing what alternative things philosophers could do. Also we should make alliances with other subjects. People outside the discipline are much more likely to want to fund work on business ethics or medical ethics than yet another go at some concept or metaphysical question.
I think this view of Matti Eklund’s has a lot to be said for it:
If we can’t disprove the Gettier stuff, perhaps we can hope that people will get bored of it (if we provide them with a less boring alternative).
When you can’t disprove something the straightforward way is to accept it. In this case you can switch to a more construtivist notion of knowledge. To quote Heinz von Förster: “Truth is the invention of a liar.”
The problem isn’t that you can’t do anything useful with ontology but that a lot of analytic philosophers are confused about the subject and produce papers that provide no value.
Barry Smith does deal with the question of knowledge and get’s funded because he actually does something useful. Applied ontology is useful for bioinformatics and other fields likely also would profit from it.
It possible that in one or two decades bioinformatic inspired mapping of mental states is good enough that the psychology folks with their DSM simply loses it’s authority.