If materialism is a scientific hypothesis, it is disproveable, ie it could run into a phenomenon it cannot explain.
I could imagine such a thing happening. The fact that it hasn’t happened is why we should be firm materialists. As it stands, we have every reason to expect that when we delve into the neurobiology of the brain, we will find a complete, material, physical explanation for the phenomenon of “people talking about qualia.” Yes, there’s “still a chance” that consciousness may turn out to somehow lie outside the realm of physics as we know it, but that doesn’t license you to believe or expect it.
Materialism could be a well-confirmed hypothesis that we should accept fairly firmly, but that does’t “clear up” any
problems whatsoever. Believing, today, that the qualia will one day have a materialistic explanation does not tell us today
what that explanation is.
Yes, I agree. I’m only claiming that materialists should classify the remaining hard work as neurobiology, not philosophy. On the philosophical side, we should realize that the answer to questions like “How do material brains give rise to immaterial qualia?” is “There are no immaterial things; investigate the brain more thoroughly and you will understand the basis of internal experience.”
Yes, I agree. I’m only claiming that materialists should classify the remaining hard work as neurobiology, not philosophy.
This is not clear at all—even though I do otherwise agree with your physicalist premises—because the most detailed evidence about subjective experience has been collected by philosophers, namely phenomenologists. The “hard” work probably encompasses any of biology, physics and philosophy.
I could imagine such a thing happening. The fact that it hasn’t happened is why we should be firm materialists. As it stands, we have every reason to expect that when we delve into the neurobiology of the brain, we will find a complete, material, physical explanation for the phenomenon of “people talking about qualia.” Yes, there’s “still a chance” that consciousness may turn out to somehow lie outside the realm of physics as we know it, but that doesn’t license you to believe or expect it.
Materialism could be a well-confirmed hypothesis that we should accept fairly firmly, but that does’t “clear up” any problems whatsoever. Believing, today, that the qualia will one day have a materialistic explanation does not tell us today what that explanation is.
Yes, I agree. I’m only claiming that materialists should classify the remaining hard work as neurobiology, not philosophy. On the philosophical side, we should realize that the answer to questions like “How do material brains give rise to immaterial qualia?” is “There are no immaterial things; investigate the brain more thoroughly and you will understand the basis of internal experience.”
It’s not clear who is supposed to be posing that question. The Hard Problem is usually posed without prejudice to the materiality of qualia.
That is an expecation about an answer, not an answer.
This is not clear at all—even though I do otherwise agree with your physicalist premises—because the most detailed evidence about subjective experience has been collected by philosophers, namely phenomenologists. The “hard” work probably encompasses any of biology, physics and philosophy.
Could you taboo “material”/”immaterial”. In particular are, say, video game characters “material”?
Expecting the brain to be non-reducible makes you open to magic explanations.
Expecting it to be reducible is not in itself an explanation.