As Dagon said, blackmail is a sequential game. And the chicken payoff matrix is a poor fit: if the blackmailer faces a large penalty for revealing their information to the world, then the blackmailer’s threat is not credible.
I did not mean to imply that the choices had to be made simultaneous, or in any other particular order, just that this is the type of payoff matrix. But I also think that “simultaneous choice” v.s. “sequential game” is a false dichotomy. If both players are UDT, every game is a game simultaneous choice game (where the choices are over complete policies).
I know that according to what I describe, the blackmailers threat is not credible in the game theory sense of the word. Sow what? It is still possible to make credible threats in the common-use meaning of the word, which is what matters.
As Dagon said, blackmail is a sequential game. And the chicken payoff matrix is a poor fit: if the blackmailer faces a large penalty for revealing their information to the world, then the blackmailer’s threat is not credible.
I did not mean to imply that the choices had to be made simultaneous, or in any other particular order, just that this is the type of payoff matrix. But I also think that “simultaneous choice” v.s. “sequential game” is a false dichotomy. If both players are UDT, every game is a game simultaneous choice game (where the choices are over complete policies).
I know that according to what I describe, the blackmailers threat is not credible in the game theory sense of the word. Sow what? It is still possible to make credible threats in the common-use meaning of the word, which is what matters.
Threatening to crash your car unless the passenger gives you a dollar is also not credible in the common meaning of the word...