His view on personal identity as necessary connected with physical body is arbitrary at least—he uses it as a counterargument against big-world immortality. (p.3 “Here, personal identity is tracked by following a physically distinct copy”.)
The main error in Mallah’s article is that he assumes that after QS (quantum suicide) the measure of copies who will survive will be only 50 per cent, and this is equal to dying in 50 per cent cases.
First, the surprising thing is that the measure is not necessary declining after QS, if we take into account other my copies: forgetting just one bit of information is equal to two fold increase of the measure of a mind in the multiverse, because two its copies—which were different on that bit—now become equal. So, I can manipulate my measure by forgetting random bits of information, and if I forget 100 bits, it will increase my measure 10power30 times. (I recently had a post about it “Quantum immortality: Is decline of measure compensated by merging timelines?”
In normal life, such forgetting is happening all the time, but implied jumps of measure don’t have much effect on us. Thus, decline of measure after QS could be ignored.
Did you see my recent article which tentatively support QI: “Forever and Again: Necessary Conditions for “Quantum Immortality” and its Practical Implications”?
His view on personal identity as necessary connected with physical body is arbitrary at least—he uses it as a counterargument against big-world immortality. (p.3 “Here, personal identity is tracked by following a physically distinct copy”.)
The main error in Mallah’s article is that he assumes that after QS (quantum suicide) the measure of copies who will survive will be only 50 per cent, and this is equal to dying in 50 per cent cases.
First, the surprising thing is that the measure is not necessary declining after QS, if we take into account other my copies: forgetting just one bit of information is equal to two fold increase of the measure of a mind in the multiverse, because two its copies—which were different on that bit—now become equal. So, I can manipulate my measure by forgetting random bits of information, and if I forget 100 bits, it will increase my measure 10power30 times. (I recently had a post about it “Quantum immortality: Is decline of measure compensated by merging timelines?”
In normal life, such forgetting is happening all the time, but implied jumps of measure don’t have much effect on us. Thus, decline of measure after QS could be ignored.