Legal personhood seems to my understanding to be designed around the built in wants of humans. That part of my point was to argue for why an uploaded human would still be closer to fitting the type signature that legal personhood is designed for—kinds of pain, ways things can be bad, how urgent a problem is or isn’t, etc. AI negative valences probably don’t have the same dynamics as ours. Not core to the question of how to make promises to them, more so saying there’s an impedance mismatch. The core is the first bit—clonable, pausable, immortal software. An uploaded human would have those attributes as well.
Thanks. Could you help me understand what this has to do with legal personhood?
Legal personhood seems to my understanding to be designed around the built in wants of humans. That part of my point was to argue for why an uploaded human would still be closer to fitting the type signature that legal personhood is designed for—kinds of pain, ways things can be bad, how urgent a problem is or isn’t, etc. AI negative valences probably don’t have the same dynamics as ours. Not core to the question of how to make promises to them, more so saying there’s an impedance mismatch. The core is the first bit—clonable, pausable, immortal software. An uploaded human would have those attributes as well.