I don’t understand this comment. The decision procedure is specified in terms of the players’ stated utility values, which can already contain lies. It seems reasonable to demand that the procedure should yield a symmetric outcome when given symmetric input.
If lies are seen as strategic considerations, they should be part of the decision problem. I agree that technically we can limit the scope of the official decision to something symmetric, but allowing non-symmetric things to affect this setup seems sufficiently similar to allowing non-symmetric things to happen within the setup, which makes motivation for Stuart’s construction unclear to me.
I still don’t understand. The idea that the (possibly symmetric) outcome must not make unilateral deviations profitable is just the idea of Nash equilibrium. Do you think it shouldn’t be used?
I don’t understand this comment. The decision procedure is specified in terms of the players’ stated utility values, which can already contain lies. It seems reasonable to demand that the procedure should yield a symmetric outcome when given symmetric input.
If lies are seen as strategic considerations, they should be part of the decision problem. I agree that technically we can limit the scope of the official decision to something symmetric, but allowing non-symmetric things to affect this setup seems sufficiently similar to allowing non-symmetric things to happen within the setup, which makes motivation for Stuart’s construction unclear to me.
I still don’t understand. The idea that the (possibly symmetric) outcome must not make unilateral deviations profitable is just the idea of Nash equilibrium. Do you think it shouldn’t be used?