What’s wrong with “Boltzmann brains will be common later but the world is yet young so none have ever existed yet”? Does this stance run into weird anthropics problems?
That only rephrases the question as “why do I exist in a young world (as opposed to after the heat death when there are many more observers with my specific memories and present perception).”
Not on its own if almost nobody is early. If people play a lottery and you win, it’s not enough as an explanation “someone had to be lucky” if there are models with higher prior probability.
To dissolve this problem, logical positivism works, like I wrote in my other comment here.
What’s wrong with “Boltzmann brains will be common later but the world is yet young so none have ever existed yet”? Does this stance run into weird anthropics problems?
That only rephrases the question as “why do I exist in a young world (as opposed to after the heat death when there are many more observers with my specific memories and present perception).”
Is “somebody had to be early and it might as well be me” a valid answer?
Not on its own if almost nobody is early. If
To dissolve this problem, logical positivism works, like I wrote in my other comment here.
Thanks for the lottery analogy that helps