Doesn’t this argument prove too much? Why doesn’t similar reasoning rule out other mentally-impaired states like drunkenness, dreams, and brain injuries? In fact, why doesn’t it rule out being a flawed human being, rather than an ideal reasoner?
Even if all your memories are false, couldn’t you still reason validly about abstract concepts (like math) and hypothetical scenarios? This seems to show that BBs can do at least some valid reasoning.
Even if you might be in some state S that would totally prevent you from reasoning validly, if you conjectured you were in some state T that would permit you to reason validly, and your reasoning based on that conjecture leads to a contradiction, wouldn’t that allow you to rule out state T without ruling out state S? This seems to show that you can do at least some useful reasoning without completely ruling out that you are in an impaired state.
Some non-Boltzmann minds like most dreaming humans can’t do any useful reasoning, but normal humans can. We know we can because we use it to succeed at life, and we know we are succeeding at life because we trust our senses. You have to ground your belief in reality in something; if you fully distrust your senses then, yes, you cannot reason about reality, just as a Boltzmann brain can’t. And you can’t reason about logic either, because we learn about logic using our physical senses.
You could not because your definitions of those concepts, and your understanding of the rules of reasoning, and your memory of starting a single-sentence-long proof or chain of thought by the time you’re finishing it, would be as false as all your other memories. You can’t reason about 2+2=5 if you don’t know what + means.
Who is “you” in “if you conjectured”? You have to assume you’re able to reason at all, before you can reason about state T. You, Dweomite, can make an argument about T, because you’re not in an impaired state. A Boltzmann brain could not validly make the same argument, in the sense of arriving at a correct conclusion because the argument was correct. A Boltzmann brain which is considering your argument about T is equally likely to believe or disbelieve it, because it came into being thinking it just thought through it and either accepted or rejected it.
My dreaming brain isn’t entirely incapable of useful reasoning—sometimes I can recognize that I am dreaming and choose whether or not to wake up, although during a dream I also tend not to be capable of doing coherent reasoning for more than a short period of time.
I did say most dreaming humans. But the point isn’t how well dreamers can reason, that’s just an example and if it doesn’t serve it’s not essential. My argument was that imperfect reasoners can still be trusted because they can be evaluated empirically on their success, and their reasoning ability is caused by evolution and learning in an ordered environment; whereas Boltzmann brains are not grounded, and any correct reasoning they carry out will be an accident.
Doesn’t this argument prove too much? Why doesn’t similar reasoning rule out other mentally-impaired states like drunkenness, dreams, and brain injuries? In fact, why doesn’t it rule out being a flawed human being, rather than an ideal reasoner?
Even if all your memories are false, couldn’t you still reason validly about abstract concepts (like math) and hypothetical scenarios? This seems to show that BBs can do at least some valid reasoning.
Even if you might be in some state S that would totally prevent you from reasoning validly, if you conjectured you were in some state T that would permit you to reason validly, and your reasoning based on that conjecture leads to a contradiction, wouldn’t that allow you to rule out state T without ruling out state S? This seems to show that you can do at least some useful reasoning without completely ruling out that you are in an impaired state.
Some non-Boltzmann minds like most dreaming humans can’t do any useful reasoning, but normal humans can. We know we can because we use it to succeed at life, and we know we are succeeding at life because we trust our senses. You have to ground your belief in reality in something; if you fully distrust your senses then, yes, you cannot reason about reality, just as a Boltzmann brain can’t. And you can’t reason about logic either, because we learn about logic using our physical senses.
You could not because your definitions of those concepts, and your understanding of the rules of reasoning, and your memory of starting a single-sentence-long proof or chain of thought by the time you’re finishing it, would be as false as all your other memories. You can’t reason about 2+2=5 if you don’t know what + means.
Who is “you” in “if you conjectured”? You have to assume you’re able to reason at all, before you can reason about state T. You, Dweomite, can make an argument about T, because you’re not in an impaired state. A Boltzmann brain could not validly make the same argument, in the sense of arriving at a correct conclusion because the argument was correct. A Boltzmann brain which is considering your argument about T is equally likely to believe or disbelieve it, because it came into being thinking it just thought through it and either accepted or rejected it.
My dreaming brain isn’t entirely incapable of useful reasoning—sometimes I can recognize that I am dreaming and choose whether or not to wake up, although during a dream I also tend not to be capable of doing coherent reasoning for more than a short period of time.
I did say most dreaming humans. But the point isn’t how well dreamers can reason, that’s just an example and if it doesn’t serve it’s not essential. My argument was that imperfect reasoners can still be trusted because they can be evaluated empirically on their success, and their reasoning ability is caused by evolution and learning in an ordered environment; whereas Boltzmann brains are not grounded, and any correct reasoning they carry out will be an accident.