Agree that the simulator theory actually needs to compress our observed bits. I don’t think you can always get the same explanatory algorithms more simply without a simulation though. As an extreme case, if the simulators make contact and demonstrate control over the simulation to us, you’re probably not getting a shorter explanatory algorithm that doesn’t involve a simulation. There could also be more subtle signs, like our physics in particular proving to be the sort of thing you’d expect to be simulated at a particular short address in a particular physics that’s notably simpler than ours.
Well sure. If you get something that’s Bayesian evidence of a simulation, then Solomonoff as a formalization of Bayes should then upweight simulations.
I don’t see how our physics could be simpler to simulate in a way that isn’t just even simpler to compute directly, though.
Agree that the simulator theory actually needs to compress our observed bits. I don’t think you can always get the same explanatory algorithms more simply without a simulation though. As an extreme case, if the simulators make contact and demonstrate control over the simulation to us, you’re probably not getting a shorter explanatory algorithm that doesn’t involve a simulation. There could also be more subtle signs, like our physics in particular proving to be the sort of thing you’d expect to be simulated at a particular short address in a particular physics that’s notably simpler than ours.
Well sure. If you get something that’s Bayesian evidence of a simulation, then Solomonoff as a formalization of Bayes should then upweight simulations.
I don’t see how our physics could be simpler to simulate in a way that isn’t just even simpler to compute directly, though.