What even words aren’t even paintbrush handles? At least not for ourselves (for relaying info to other people it still works this way). They are more like… generated after the fact that we’ve imagined something, describing them in order to be able to forward the info to others.
I’ve heard about a case about someone, after having stroke I think, had his speech centers “offline”, and while he couldn’t think (or even imagine words), according to a later description, he could think surprisingly intelligently at that time too. (No reference unfortunately… maybe a Pinker book?) So we might mix up thinking in words with thinking itself because the former happens automatically when we direct attention somewhere?
By the way, has anyone heard about experiments in order to ensure that people who report inability to imagine things not just only have a lack of introspection of that? (like an “imagination” version of blindsight ).
Eliezer was talking about communicating the other way—building images from words you hear or read.
Some people think directly (at least at the first awareness-accessible level) in words, some in something else with later translation to words, some in something else with words only used to communicate. Some people alternate between these. I think all models that predict more unified behaviors come from the one psyche fallacy.
What even words aren’t even paintbrush handles? At least not for ourselves (for relaying info to other people it still works this way). They are more like… generated after the fact that we’ve imagined something, describing them in order to be able to forward the info to others.
I’ve heard about a case about someone, after having stroke I think, had his speech centers “offline”, and while he couldn’t think (or even imagine words), according to a later description, he could think surprisingly intelligently at that time too. (No reference unfortunately… maybe a Pinker book?) So we might mix up thinking in words with thinking itself because the former happens automatically when we direct attention somewhere?
By the way, has anyone heard about experiments in order to ensure that people who report inability to imagine things not just only have a lack of introspection of that? (like an “imagination” version of blindsight ).
Eliezer was talking about communicating the other way—building images from words you hear or read.
Some people think directly (at least at the first awareness-accessible level) in words, some in something else with later translation to words, some in something else with words only used to communicate. Some people alternate between these. I think all models that predict more unified behaviors come from the one psyche fallacy.