Each player independently commits to a bargaining strategy that will be played regardless of whether the bargaining game is or .
What exactly do we mean by a “bargaining strategy” here? What restrictions does it place on the ways in which the player’s behavior can depend on the game?
Are we assuming that this bargaining strategy behaves identically when we change the disagreement point from to ? If so, why would that be a valid assumption?
Also: is the text in this section meant to express a coherent argument on its own or just be a lossy summary of the more detailed argument in later sections? If just the latter then maybe it’s not worth answering my parent question.
Yep it’s the latter. To answer the questions, as far as I recall what we intended when writing this:
Bargaining strategies are any unilateral (potentially conditional) commitments to actions in the game.
It’s just stipulated that the bilateral meta-commitment the agents consider whether to follow is, “Use the same bargaining strategy regardless of whether the bargaining game is G0 or Gdi”. (This is analogous to how renegotiation programs use the same default program against renegotiators and non-renegotiators, except that renegotiation programs are unilateral. ETA: Tbc, in both the bilateral and unilateral case, the agents could of course use commitments that deviate from this constraint if they wanted to — but the argument we make is, no matter which commitments they consider using that deviate from this constraint, they’d be individually better off instead plugging those commitments into the meta-commitment that adheres to this constraint. Under the belief assumptions, that is.)
What exactly do we mean by a “bargaining strategy” here? What restrictions does it place on the ways in which the player’s behavior can depend on the game?
Are we assuming that this bargaining strategy behaves identically when we change the disagreement point from
Also: is the text in this section meant to express a coherent argument on its own or just be a lossy summary of the more detailed argument in later sections? If just the latter then maybe it’s not worth answering my parent question.
Yep it’s the latter. To answer the questions, as far as I recall what we intended when writing this:
Bargaining strategies are any unilateral (potentially conditional) commitments to actions in the game.
It’s just stipulated that the bilateral meta-commitment the agents consider whether to follow is, “Use the same bargaining strategy regardless of whether the bargaining game is G0 or Gdi”. (This is analogous to how renegotiation programs use the same default program against renegotiators and non-renegotiators, except that renegotiation programs are unilateral. ETA: Tbc, in both the bilateral and unilateral case, the agents could of course use commitments that deviate from this constraint if they wanted to — but the argument we make is, no matter which commitments they consider using that deviate from this constraint, they’d be individually better off instead plugging those commitments into the meta-commitment that adheres to this constraint. Under the belief assumptions, that is.)