Yep it’s the latter. To answer the questions, as far as I recall what we intended when writing this:
Bargaining strategies are any unilateral (potentially conditional) commitments to actions in the game.
It’s just stipulated that the bilateral meta-commitment the agents consider whether to follow is, “Use the same bargaining strategy regardless of whether the bargaining game is G0 or Gdi”. (This is analogous to how renegotiation programs use the same default program against renegotiators and non-renegotiators, except that renegotiation programs are unilateral. ETA: Tbc, in both the bilateral and unilateral case, the agents could of course use commitments that deviate from this constraint if they wanted to — but the argument we make is, no matter which commitments they consider using that deviate from this constraint, they’d be individually better off instead plugging those commitments into the meta-commitment that adheres to this constraint. Under the belief assumptions, that is.)
Yep it’s the latter. To answer the questions, as far as I recall what we intended when writing this:
Bargaining strategies are any unilateral (potentially conditional) commitments to actions in the game.
It’s just stipulated that the bilateral meta-commitment the agents consider whether to follow is, “Use the same bargaining strategy regardless of whether the bargaining game is G0 or Gdi”. (This is analogous to how renegotiation programs use the same default program against renegotiators and non-renegotiators, except that renegotiation programs are unilateral. ETA: Tbc, in both the bilateral and unilateral case, the agents could of course use commitments that deviate from this constraint if they wanted to — but the argument we make is, no matter which commitments they consider using that deviate from this constraint, they’d be individually better off instead plugging those commitments into the meta-commitment that adheres to this constraint. Under the belief assumptions, that is.)