Yeah, I also guess that something in this direction is plausibly right.
perhaps nothingness actually contains a superposition of all logically possible states, models, and systems, with their probability weighted by the inverse of their complexity.
I think the relevant question here is why we should expect their probability to be weighted by the inverse of their complexity. Is there any abstract theoretical argument for this? In other words, we need to find an a priori justification for this type of Ockham’s razor.
Here is one such attempt: Any possible world can be described as a long logical conjunction of “basic” facts. By the principle of indifference, assume any basic fact has the same a priori probability (perhaps even probability 0.5, equal to its own negation), and that they are a priori independent. Then longer conjunctions will have lower probability. But longer conjunctions also describe more complex possible worlds. So simpler possible worlds are more likely.
Though it’s not clear whether this really works. Any conjunction completely describing a possible world would also need to include a statement ”… and no other basic facts are true”, which is itself a quantified statement, not a basic fact. Otherwise all conjunctive descriptions of possible worlds would be equally long.
Yeah, I also guess that something in this direction is plausibly right.
I think the relevant question here is why we should expect their probability to be weighted by the inverse of their complexity. Is there any abstract theoretical argument for this? In other words, we need to find an a priori justification for this type of Ockham’s razor.
Here is one such attempt: Any possible world can be described as a long logical conjunction of “basic” facts. By the principle of indifference, assume any basic fact has the same a priori probability (perhaps even probability 0.5, equal to its own negation), and that they are a priori independent. Then longer conjunctions will have lower probability. But longer conjunctions also describe more complex possible worlds. So simpler possible worlds are more likely.
Though it’s not clear whether this really works. Any conjunction completely describing a possible world would also need to include a statement ”… and no other basic facts are true”, which is itself a quantified statement, not a basic fact. Otherwise all conjunctive descriptions of possible worlds would be equally long.