I mean neither, I mean ‘a reason to devote time and resources to evaluating the evidence for and against a position.’
That’s fine, that’s not different from ‘hearing out an argument’ in any way important to my point (unless I’m missing something).
EDIT: Sorry, if you don’t want to include ‘that makes some reference to the credibility...etc.’ (or something like that) in what you mean by ‘trust’ then you should use a different term. Curiosity, or money, or romantic interest would all be reasons to devote time...etc. and clearly none of those are rightly called ‘trust’.
my estimate of the prior probability that Sam is saying something false or incoherent.
What do you have in mind as the basis for such a prior? Can you give me an example?
Point taken about other reasons to devote resources other than trust. I think we’re good here.
Re: example… I don’t mean anything deeply clever. E.g., if the last ten superficially-implausible ideas Sam espoused were false or incoherent, my priors for it will be higher than if the last ten such ideas were counterintuitive and brilliant.
Hm. I can’t argue with that, and I suppose it’s trivial to extend that to ‘if the last ten superficially-implausible ideas philosophy professors/books/etc. espoused were false or incoherent...’. So, okay, trust is an appropriate (because necessary) attitude toward philosophers and philosophical institutions. I think it’s right to say that philosophy doesn’t have external indicators in the way physics or medicine does, but the importance of that point seems diminished.
That’s fine, that’s not different from ‘hearing out an argument’ in any way important to my point (unless I’m missing something).
EDIT: Sorry, if you don’t want to include ‘that makes some reference to the credibility...etc.’ (or something like that) in what you mean by ‘trust’ then you should use a different term. Curiosity, or money, or romantic interest would all be reasons to devote time...etc. and clearly none of those are rightly called ‘trust’.
What do you have in mind as the basis for such a prior? Can you give me an example?
Point taken about other reasons to devote resources other than trust. I think we’re good here.
Re: example… I don’t mean anything deeply clever. E.g., if the last ten superficially-implausible ideas Sam espoused were false or incoherent, my priors for it will be higher than if the last ten such ideas were counterintuitive and brilliant.
Hm. I can’t argue with that, and I suppose it’s trivial to extend that to ‘if the last ten superficially-implausible ideas philosophy professors/books/etc. espoused were false or incoherent...’. So, okay, trust is an appropriate (because necessary) attitude toward philosophers and philosophical institutions. I think it’s right to say that philosophy doesn’t have external indicators in the way physics or medicine does, but the importance of that point seems diminished.