Point taken about other reasons to devote resources other than trust. I think we’re good here.
Re: example… I don’t mean anything deeply clever. E.g., if the last ten superficially-implausible ideas Sam espoused were false or incoherent, my priors for it will be higher than if the last ten such ideas were counterintuitive and brilliant.
Hm. I can’t argue with that, and I suppose it’s trivial to extend that to ‘if the last ten superficially-implausible ideas philosophy professors/books/etc. espoused were false or incoherent...’. So, okay, trust is an appropriate (because necessary) attitude toward philosophers and philosophical institutions. I think it’s right to say that philosophy doesn’t have external indicators in the way physics or medicine does, but the importance of that point seems diminished.
Point taken about other reasons to devote resources other than trust. I think we’re good here.
Re: example… I don’t mean anything deeply clever. E.g., if the last ten superficially-implausible ideas Sam espoused were false or incoherent, my priors for it will be higher than if the last ten such ideas were counterintuitive and brilliant.
Hm. I can’t argue with that, and I suppose it’s trivial to extend that to ‘if the last ten superficially-implausible ideas philosophy professors/books/etc. espoused were false or incoherent...’. So, okay, trust is an appropriate (because necessary) attitude toward philosophers and philosophical institutions. I think it’s right to say that philosophy doesn’t have external indicators in the way physics or medicine does, but the importance of that point seems diminished.