Parties aren’t real, the power must be in specific humans or incentive systems.
I would caution against saying “parties aren’t real” for at least two reasons. First, it more-or-less invites definitional wars which are rarely productive. Second, when we think about explanatory and predictive theories, whether something is “real” (however you define it) is often irrelevant. What matters more is is the concept sufficiently clear / standardized / “objective” to measure something and thus serve as some replicable part of a theory.
Humans have long been interested in making sense of power through various theories. One approach is to reduce it to purely individual decisions. Another approach involves attributing power to groups of people or even culture. Models serve many purposes, so I try to ground these kinds of discussions with questions such as:
Are you trying to predict a person’s best next action?
Are you trying to design a political or institutional system such that individual power can manifest in productive ways?
Are you trying to measure the effectiveness of a given politician in a given system, keeping in mind the practical and realistic limits of their agency?
These are very different questions, leading to very different models.
I would caution against saying “parties aren’t real” for at least two reasons. First, it more-or-less invites definitional wars which are rarely productive. Second, when we think about explanatory and predictive theories, whether something is “real” (however you define it) is often irrelevant. What matters more is is the concept sufficiently clear / standardized / “objective” to measure something and thus serve as some replicable part of a theory.
I think this (implied) mode of reasoning can be pretty useful. For example:
Sally: A ghost just turned my television on again!
Tom: Ghosts aren’t real, so that’s not what happened.
But I’m like 75% sure that American political parties do exist (i.e., the correct ontology of the universe includes political parties alongside electrons, minds, and trees). I’d like to hear @Elizabeth’s argument against this.
I would caution against saying “parties aren’t real” for at least two reasons. First, it more-or-less invites definitional wars which are rarely productive. Second, when we think about explanatory and predictive theories, whether something is “real” (however you define it) is often irrelevant. What matters more is is the concept sufficiently clear / standardized / “objective” to measure something and thus serve as some replicable part of a theory.
Humans have long been interested in making sense of power through various theories. One approach is to reduce it to purely individual decisions. Another approach involves attributing power to groups of people or even culture. Models serve many purposes, so I try to ground these kinds of discussions with questions such as:
Are you trying to predict a person’s best next action?
Are you trying to design a political or institutional system such that individual power can manifest in productive ways?
Are you trying to measure the effectiveness of a given politician in a given system, keeping in mind the practical and realistic limits of their agency?
These are very different questions, leading to very different models.
I think this (implied) mode of reasoning can be pretty useful. For example:
Sally: A ghost just turned my television on again!
Tom: Ghosts aren’t real, so that’s not what happened.
But I’m like 75% sure that American political parties do exist (i.e., the correct ontology of the universe includes political parties alongside electrons, minds, and trees). I’d like to hear @Elizabeth’s argument against this.