I would caution against saying “parties aren’t real” for at least two reasons. First, it more-or-less invites definitional wars which are rarely productive. Second, when we think about explanatory and predictive theories, whether something is “real” (however you define it) is often irrelevant. What matters more is is the concept sufficiently clear / standardized / “objective” to measure something and thus serve as some replicable part of a theory.
I think this (implied) mode of reasoning can be pretty useful. For example:
Sally: A ghost just turned my television on again!
Tom: Ghosts aren’t real, so that’s not what happened.
But I’m like 75% sure that American political parties do exist (i.e., the correct ontology of the universe includes political parties alongside electrons, minds, and trees). I’d like to hear @Elizabeth’s argument against this.
I think this (implied) mode of reasoning can be pretty useful. For example:
Sally: A ghost just turned my television on again!
Tom: Ghosts aren’t real, so that’s not what happened.
But I’m like 75% sure that American political parties do exist (i.e., the correct ontology of the universe includes political parties alongside electrons, minds, and trees). I’d like to hear @Elizabeth’s argument against this.