These citations would only include trivial data we know about anyways. E.g. “If you injure a baby, it cries (which seems pretty similar to what I do when in pain)”. Babies are hardly different from adults in this regard. So it makes little sense to demand “evidence” for babies being able to feel pain, but not for (other) adults. I think in all these cases I can infer other minds with an inference from analogy, i.e. from similarity to myself in known properties (behavior, brain) to unknown properties (consciousness). For very dissimilar entities, like rocks, the probability of being conscious would fall back to some kind of prior, though I don’t know how such a prior could be justified. (Purely intuitively it seems clear that rocks being conscious is highly unlikely, but it isn’t obvious why.)
Babies are hardly different from adults in this regard.
No, babies are very different from adults in this regard, inasmuch as adults can tell us that they are in pain, can describe the pain, etc.
For very dissimilar entities, like rocks, the probability of being conscious would fall back to some kind of prior, though I don’t know how such a prior could be justified. (Purely intuitively it seems clear that rocks being conscious is highly unlikely, but it isn’t obvious why.)
… really? You can’t think of any reasons for this belief? Just pure intuition, that’s all you’ve got to go on? Are you seriously making this claim?
No, babies are very different from adults in this regard, inasmuch as adults can tell us that they are in pain, can describe the pain, etc.
This doesn’t look like a big difference to me. Moreover, adults may also be unable to speak due to various illnesses or disabilities.
For very dissimilar entities, like rocks, the probability of being conscious would fall back to some kind of prior, though I don’t know how such a prior could be justified. (Purely intuitively it seems clear that rocks being conscious is highly unlikely, but it isn’t obvious why.)
… really? You can’t think of any reasons for this belief? Just pure intuition, that’s all you’ve got to go on? Are you seriously making this claim?
Yes. At least not from the top of my head. Note that this prior is supposed to not incorporate the information that you are conscious yourself.
These citations would only include trivial data we know about anyways. E.g. “If you injure a baby, it cries (which seems pretty similar to what I do when in pain)”. Babies are hardly different from adults in this regard. So it makes little sense to demand “evidence” for babies being able to feel pain, but not for (other) adults. I think in all these cases I can infer other minds with an inference from analogy, i.e. from similarity to myself in known properties (behavior, brain) to unknown properties (consciousness). For very dissimilar entities, like rocks, the probability of being conscious would fall back to some kind of prior, though I don’t know how such a prior could be justified. (Purely intuitively it seems clear that rocks being conscious is highly unlikely, but it isn’t obvious why.)
No, babies are very different from adults in this regard, inasmuch as adults can tell us that they are in pain, can describe the pain, etc.
… really? You can’t think of any reasons for this belief? Just pure intuition, that’s all you’ve got to go on? Are you seriously making this claim?
This doesn’t look like a big difference to me. Moreover, adults may also be unable to speak due to various illnesses or disabilities.
Yes. At least not from the top of my head. Note that this prior is supposed to not incorporate the information that you are conscious yourself.