street epistemology suggests, by what it chooses to ask about [....] that people should be sceptical that they can know anything.
That isn’t entirely neutral… although it’s hard to see how you could say or do anything that is entirely neutral.. but it is well warranted. Epistemologists have identified a lot of specific things laypeople get wrong, and moreover have general arguments to the effect that it is hard to know anything.
it treats scepticism as a positive position or worldivew, abstracted from the intentional content , rather than an attitude toward particular beliefs or proposals. (“Sceptical about what?” “Oh, just sceptical in general.“)
Are you saying that global scepticism is wrong or indefensible? Or just that it is presupposition of the street Epistemologist’s, and so that the problem is done kind of bias.
It suggests that the methods they use are so faulty that knowing the particulars of the belief is extraneous information.
In my experience, when laypeople use special pleading, they are overwhelmingly likely to be using it fallaciously. If you are offering philosophical therapy to people, it is reasonable to assume they are inclined to overconfidence and under generalisation, just as it is reasonable to assume they aren’t eating enough vegetables.
Are you saying that global scepticism is wrong or indefensible? Or just that it is presupposition of the street Epistemologist’s, and so that the problem is done kind of bias.
The second is closer to what I’m saying. SE makes a whole bunch of loaded assumptions about knowledge and method which are baked into the structure of the conversation but which the conversation is designed to avoid discussing. Hence what I say in the last two paragraphs.
In my experience, when laypeople use special pleading
I’m using “special pleading” to summarise the opposite of rule based epistemology, the thing you think is excluded. (I’m not actually all that the clear what it is. Some examples would be useful).
The second is closer to what I’m saying. SE makes a whole bunch of loaded assumptions about knowledge and method which are baked into the structure of the conversation but which the conversation is designed to avoid discussing. Hence what I say in the last two paragraphs.
To repeat: some assumptions have to be made, and the ones that SE makes are fairly standard.
That isn’t entirely neutral… although it’s hard to see how you could say or do anything that is entirely neutral.. but it is well warranted. Epistemologists have identified a lot of specific things laypeople get wrong, and moreover have general arguments to the effect that it is hard to know anything.
Are you saying that global scepticism is wrong or indefensible? Or just that it is presupposition of the street Epistemologist’s, and so that the problem is done kind of bias.
In my experience, when laypeople use special pleading, they are overwhelmingly likely to be using it fallaciously. If you are offering philosophical therapy to people, it is reasonable to assume they are inclined to overconfidence and under generalisation, just as it is reasonable to assume they aren’t eating enough vegetables.
The second is closer to what I’m saying. SE makes a whole bunch of loaded assumptions about knowledge and method which are baked into the structure of the conversation but which the conversation is designed to avoid discussing. Hence what I say in the last two paragraphs.
What does this have to do with special pleading?
I’m using “special pleading” to summarise the opposite of rule based epistemology, the thing you think is excluded. (I’m not actually all that the clear what it is. Some examples would be useful).
To repeat: some assumptions have to be made, and the ones that SE makes are fairly standard.