Badiou earlier postulated that violence against the state was only legitimate when it was expressed “defensively,” e.g., when Occupy Wall Street was thrown out of Central Park, the protesters were in some sense justified in using force to prevent being thrown out.
Zizek counters that it’s too hard to tell whether or not the state is being excessively violent.
Indeed, “from the standpoint of the oppressed, the very existence of a state is a violent fact.” Compare with Republican outrage in the post-election cycle—impotent calls for secession and the like.
Therefore, in the twisted sense of the parent comment, “all violence against the state is defensive.”
He then presents his main historical example, the Jacobin legacy. Mostly responsible for perverting the “will of the people” during the French revolution into the violence of the Reign of Terror.
Obligatory Hitler/Nazi reference.
The error seems to be the slippery conflation from “the oppressed” in part 3 (for whom violence against the state is legitimate) to “everyone” in part 4.
You know, this ending was kinda good for your average Godwin’s law bait. If we’re okay with condemning all the German non-resisters and excusing outright “terrorism” against a widely popular regime (like the Maquis’ actions in France), then we should also be more tolerant of insurgent/revolutionary violence against modern governments.
(By the way, I’ve come to think that Moldbug’s post equating Breivik and Nelson Mandela was justified in this regard—only the ends of political violence really matter, as we all de facto already approve of the means.)
If we’re okay with condemning all the German non-resisters and excusing outright “terrorism” against a widely popular regime (like the Maquis’ actions in France), then we should also be more tolerant of insurgent/revolutionary violence against modern governments.
No, it doesn’t follow. Your syllogism is making one or more logical leaps somewhere.
If this was deliberate and you’re back at your “trolling” phase, I wish that you quit doing that right now, and never repeat the offense.
What country ever existed a century and a half without a rebellion? And what country can preserve its liberties if their rulers are not warned from time to time that their people preserve the spirit of resistance? Let them take arms. The remedy is to set them right as to facts, pardon and pacify them. What signify a few lives lost in a century or two? The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants. It is its natural manure.
-- Thomas Jefferson, with more context than usual.
Nah, not trolling—at least, not if Moldbug also meant to be taken seriously with his post on Breivik. At first I was surprised and shocked by it; then, as with many far-right observations, I came around to the modus-tollens view—political terrorism is not as abhorrent to us as we profess, and under some circumstances it can be quite defensible.
(If you’re also shocked now, I understand and I’m sorry for hurting your feelings. Yet biting this bullet didn’t kill me and left me stronger.)
It’s not your position that I object to, but rather your argument for it.
How does excusing the Maquis’ actions against the Germans or Vichy France necessitate that we should be “more tolerant” towards violence against modern goverments?
It seems to me that the different nature and different methods of the former and latter governments means that we can treat violence against it likewise differently—even without any discussion of the ends of this violence.
That was particularly delicious.
For those who don’t read Zizekian:
Badiou earlier postulated that violence against the state was only legitimate when it was expressed “defensively,” e.g., when Occupy Wall Street was thrown out of Central Park, the protesters were in some sense justified in using force to prevent being thrown out.
Zizek counters that it’s too hard to tell whether or not the state is being excessively violent.
Indeed, “from the standpoint of the oppressed, the very existence of a state is a violent fact.” Compare with Republican outrage in the post-election cycle—impotent calls for secession and the like.
Therefore, in the twisted sense of the parent comment, “all violence against the state is defensive.”
He then presents his main historical example, the Jacobin legacy. Mostly responsible for perverting the “will of the people” during the French revolution into the violence of the Reign of Terror.
Obligatory Hitler/Nazi reference.
The error seems to be the slippery conflation from “the oppressed” in part 3 (for whom violence against the state is legitimate) to “everyone” in part 4.
You know, this ending was kinda good for your average Godwin’s law bait. If we’re okay with condemning all the German non-resisters and excusing outright “terrorism” against a widely popular regime (like the Maquis’ actions in France), then we should also be more tolerant of insurgent/revolutionary violence against modern governments.
(By the way, I’ve come to think that Moldbug’s post equating Breivik and Nelson Mandela was justified in this regard—only the ends of political violence really matter, as we all de facto already approve of the means.)
No, it doesn’t follow. Your syllogism is making one or more logical leaps somewhere.
If this was deliberate and you’re back at your “trolling” phase, I wish that you quit doing that right now, and never repeat the offense.
-- Thomas Jefferson, with more context than usual.
Nah, not trolling—at least, not if Moldbug also meant to be taken seriously with his post on Breivik. At first I was surprised and shocked by it; then, as with many far-right observations, I came around to the modus-tollens view—political terrorism is not as abhorrent to us as we profess, and under some circumstances it can be quite defensible.
(If you’re also shocked now, I understand and I’m sorry for hurting your feelings. Yet biting this bullet didn’t kill me and left me stronger.)
It’s not your position that I object to, but rather your argument for it.
How does excusing the Maquis’ actions against the Germans or Vichy France necessitate that we should be “more tolerant” towards violence against modern goverments?
It seems to me that the different nature and different methods of the former and latter governments means that we can treat violence against it likewise differently—even without any discussion of the ends of this violence.