Apparently, the first AI drones were likely being trialled in late 2025 but it likely took until a few months ago to scale up production and iron out problems. This was likely the reason that Ukraine has been able to regain territoriy for the first time in years [plus slthe shutdown of Russian access to starlink]
The killzone has now increased from 5 km to ~20-25km and with the new Hornet AI drones could extend up to 150km from the frontline.
Drone capabilities are nowhere near the ceiling, and will probably advance capability by capability. As you say, AI was being trialled for terminal guidance in 2025. Now target selection (still with human in the loop) and terminal guidance are fully operational for both strike and interceptor drones, and AI has also been a big deal in intelligence and reconnaissance.
The biggest bleeding edge capability right now is probably ground combat drones that replace infantry, which would directly alleviate Ukraine’s manpower bottleneck. Official policy is to replace 30% of infantry with UGVs by end of 2026. Ukraine’s casualty ratio is already something like 4:1 in their favor, and if 30% of their casualties are displaced to drones, it would be 6:1. At this ratio Ukraine could basically fight indefinitely, which would buy them time to fully automate the rest of their army.
I realize that LW strongly favors one side over the other, but I would take claims of 4:1 casualty ratios with a grain of salt. I don’t think I’ve seen a single person supporting these claims that wasn’t insisting that Russia was going to be out of missiles in a week four years ago. It seems like the community is a bit too susceptible to jingoism when it comes to wars that they’re in favor of.
I acknowledge there is high uncertainty in casualty ratios. 4:1 is my educated guess based on the fact that offensives typically result in 2:1 or 3:1 and Russia is using especially perilous assault tactics against prepared Ukrainian defenses. This is higher than some estimates but the absolute level really doesn’t matter for my point—UGVs are just as big a deal if the ratio is 2:1 now and would become 3:1.
As for why I mentioned the benefits to Ukraine, it’s just because they benefit more from UGVs than Russia. Russia would benefit from better FPVs and Shaheds, but it’s widely known they’re less sensitive to casualties: they seems to have an endless supply of contract soldiers, while Ukraine has a lower population and a huge desertion problem among conscripts.
offensives typically result in 2:1 or 3:1 and Russia is using especially perilous assault tactics
Of note is the fact that this absolutely isn’t true. Russia’s tactics, for the last several years, have been a very casualty-averse, slow-moving crawl westward, operating on the assumption that this is a war of attrition and that capturing land does not matter nearly as much as depleting their opponents’ reserve manpower.
If your model of an entity’s behavior has no plausible explanation (why would Russia expend an extremely limited resource to take marginally more land?), then it is worth questioning your priors. “50,000 conscripts a day with one AK-47 between them, charging into open fields” is pretty obvious wartime propaganda.
Not going to engage on this point. If it does turn out to be say 1.5:1, do you think replacing infantry with ground drones is important, or does the highest value drone capability shift somewhere else?
Not going to engage on this point. If it does turn out to be say 1.5:1, do you think replacing infantry with ground drones is important, or does the highest value drone capability shift somewhere else?
Not going to engage on this point. If it does turn out to be say 1.5:1, do you think replacing infantry with ground drones is important, or does the highest value drone capability shift somewhere else?
depending on what you mean by the killzone, I think it wouldn’t make sense to picture a killzone to extend up to 150km from a relatively stable frontline.
I am not an expert on military stuff, but from what I understand, it is very costly to operate in a killzone. specifically the kind of logistic support you need to have a frontline can’t be operated in a killzone.
AI drones now a reality and a gamechanger on the Ukraine battlefield.
Apparently, the first AI drones were likely being trialled in late 2025 but it likely took until a few months ago to scale up production and iron out problems. This was likely the reason that Ukraine has been able to regain territoriy for the first time in years [plus slthe shutdown of Russian access to starlink]
The killzone has now increased from 5 km to ~20-25km and with the new Hornet AI drones could extend up to 150km from the frontline.
Drone capabilities are nowhere near the ceiling, and will probably advance capability by capability. As you say, AI was being trialled for terminal guidance in 2025. Now target selection (still with human in the loop) and terminal guidance are fully operational for both strike and interceptor drones, and AI has also been a big deal in intelligence and reconnaissance.
The biggest bleeding edge capability right now is probably ground combat drones that replace infantry, which would directly alleviate Ukraine’s manpower bottleneck. Official policy is to replace 30% of infantry with UGVs by end of 2026. Ukraine’s casualty ratio is already something like 4:1 in their favor, and if 30% of their casualties are displaced to drones, it would be 6:1. At this ratio Ukraine could basically fight indefinitely, which would buy them time to fully automate the rest of their army.
Daniel Kokotajlo’s post from 2020 continues to be highly prescient.
I realize that LW strongly favors one side over the other, but I would take claims of 4:1 casualty ratios with a grain of salt. I don’t think I’ve seen a single person supporting these claims that wasn’t insisting that Russia was going to be out of missiles in a week four years ago. It seems like the community is a bit too susceptible to jingoism when it comes to wars that they’re in favor of.
I acknowledge there is high uncertainty in casualty ratios. 4:1 is my educated guess based on the fact that offensives typically result in 2:1 or 3:1 and Russia is using especially perilous assault tactics against prepared Ukrainian defenses. This is higher than some estimates but the absolute level really doesn’t matter for my point—UGVs are just as big a deal if the ratio is 2:1 now and would become 3:1.
As for why I mentioned the benefits to Ukraine, it’s just because they benefit more from UGVs than Russia. Russia would benefit from better FPVs and Shaheds, but it’s widely known they’re less sensitive to casualties: they seems to have an endless supply of contract soldiers, while Ukraine has a lower population and a huge desertion problem among conscripts.
Of note is the fact that this absolutely isn’t true. Russia’s tactics, for the last several years, have been a very casualty-averse, slow-moving crawl westward, operating on the assumption that this is a war of attrition and that capturing land does not matter nearly as much as depleting their opponents’ reserve manpower.
If your model of an entity’s behavior has no plausible explanation (why would Russia expend an extremely limited resource to take marginally more land?), then it is worth questioning your priors. “50,000 conscripts a day with one AK-47 between them, charging into open fields” is pretty obvious wartime propaganda.
Not going to engage on this point. If it does turn out to be say 1.5:1, do you think replacing infantry with ground drones is important, or does the highest value drone capability shift somewhere else?
Not going to engage on this point. If it does turn out to be say 1.5:1, do you think replacing infantry with ground drones is important, or does the highest value drone capability shift somewhere else?
Not going to engage on this point. If it does turn out to be say 1.5:1, do you think replacing infantry with ground drones is important, or does the highest value drone capability shift somewhere else?
depending on what you mean by the killzone, I think it wouldn’t make sense to picture a killzone to extend up to 150km from a relatively stable frontline.
I am not an expert on military stuff, but from what I understand, it is very costly to operate in a killzone. specifically the kind of logistic support you need to have a frontline can’t be operated in a killzone.