There are two senses of should. One is “If you want A, then you should do B”, meaning that B makes A more likely. The other sense is that of duty, of having a moral debt that one is obligated to pay.
When morality is treated as a duty, what one “should” do, it is an imposed burden, and some people don’t like to be imposed on. Moreover, these people will look for ways to evade that burden.
When, instead, they say “I can act according to my moral preferences”, they are picturing the satisfaction of acting according to their own preferences, similar to “I can eat according to my taste preferences”.
It’s the alienation of values into the imposed will of external and sacred authorities that causes the problem for some. Some people don’t wish to be slaves. They’re probably in the minority. For those who like being subject to an authority to whom they owe obedience, alienation of values to an external authority probably helps them achieve the values imposed by the authority.
I think the two senses are really the same: if you accept consequentialist ethics, then the moral debt meaning can be translated as “If you want utility for person/group X, you should do B”.
Whenever people use this word “should” in a sneaky way in a debate, I always find myself reminding them that it only has meaning with respect to someone or some group’s preferences, and by glossing over exactly who’s preferences we’re talking about, people can get away with making bad arguments.
I’m not saying that ordinary usages of the word “should” are statements of morality, rather the opposite: statements of morality can be translated into ordinary usage, and if they can’t they probably aren’t coherent statements.
“I am morally obliged to treat this person’s injury”
“Why?”
“Because it would stop their suffering”
Perhaps we prefer to call it a moral statement when it’s about other people’s utility functions, rather than our own. Then again, we usually don’t feel morally obliged to cater to others’ preferences except to the extent that we have a preference of our own for their preferences to be satisfied, which, thankfully, most people do.
There are two senses of should. One is “If you want A, then you should do B”, meaning that B makes A more likely. The other sense is that of duty, of having a moral debt that one is obligated to pay.
When morality is treated as a duty, what one “should” do, it is an imposed burden, and some people don’t like to be imposed on. Moreover, these people will look for ways to evade that burden.
When, instead, they say “I can act according to my moral preferences”, they are picturing the satisfaction of acting according to their own preferences, similar to “I can eat according to my taste preferences”.
It’s the alienation of values into the imposed will of external and sacred authorities that causes the problem for some. Some people don’t wish to be slaves. They’re probably in the minority. For those who like being subject to an authority to whom they owe obedience, alienation of values to an external authority probably helps them achieve the values imposed by the authority.
The other piece is that your sense of duty isn’t an infallible guide to living well any more than your immediate impulses are.
I think the two senses are really the same: if you accept consequentialist ethics, then the moral debt meaning can be translated as “If you want utility for person/group X, you should do B”.
Whenever people use this word “should” in a sneaky way in a debate, I always find myself reminding them that it only has meaning with respect to someone or some group’s preferences, and by glossing over exactly who’s preferences we’re talking about, people can get away with making bad arguments.
I think that’s over generalizing consequentialist ethics.
“I want to fix my car.”
″You should talk to Joe—he knows a lot about cars.”
The latter is perfectly ordinary usage, but generally not considered a moral or ethical statement.
I’m not saying that ordinary usages of the word “should” are statements of morality, rather the opposite: statements of morality can be translated into ordinary usage, and if they can’t they probably aren’t coherent statements.
“I am morally obliged to treat this person’s injury” “Why?” “Because it would stop their suffering”
Perhaps we prefer to call it a moral statement when it’s about other people’s utility functions, rather than our own. Then again, we usually don’t feel morally obliged to cater to others’ preferences except to the extent that we have a preference of our own for their preferences to be satisfied, which, thankfully, most people do.