How deep is your skepticism? In the context of consciousness, valence basically means the qualia of value. Are we denying a particular theory of valence, or proposing that valence is a wrong way to think about the phenomenology of value, or denying that there is any phenomenology of value at all?
At the moment, “valence” seems to me, in the material I’ve read, no more than a name reifying a noun phrase of the form “the thing that...” It is like saying that salt tastes salty due to its saltiness, or to use a well-known example, that opium produces sleep through its dormitive principle.
Uttering a noun phrase does not conjure into existence a thing that it refers to. It can conjure an idea of such a thing into your head, and then you can look at various phenomena and “see” it there, just like you can “see” the phlogiston coming out of a burning log, or “see” the demon possessing an epileptic. That is what the whole Valence sequence looks like to me, and the valence literature that I cited.
In the context of consciousness, valence basically means the qualia of value.
My scepticism then extends to the word “value”, as applied in this context. Also, I had not got the impression from the material that valences were defined to be conscious experiences, but rather, that they pervade all decision-making in the brain, that comparison of valence is “the thing that” makes decisions. For example, the fourth reference I cited is a purely speculative article asserting the existence of “micro-valences” in low-importance rapid choices like which coffee mug to select from a cupboard. But perhaps the authors would say that these micro-valences are micro-consciously perceived.
How deep is your skepticism? In the context of consciousness, valence basically means the qualia of value. Are we denying a particular theory of valence, or proposing that valence is a wrong way to think about the phenomenology of value, or denying that there is any phenomenology of value at all?
At the moment, “valence” seems to me, in the material I’ve read, no more than a name reifying a noun phrase of the form “the thing that...” It is like saying that salt tastes salty due to its saltiness, or to use a well-known example, that opium produces sleep through its dormitive principle.
Uttering a noun phrase does not conjure into existence a thing that it refers to. It can conjure an idea of such a thing into your head, and then you can look at various phenomena and “see” it there, just like you can “see” the phlogiston coming out of a burning log, or “see” the demon possessing an epileptic. That is what the whole Valence sequence looks like to me, and the valence literature that I cited.
My scepticism then extends to the word “value”, as applied in this context. Also, I had not got the impression from the material that valences were defined to be conscious experiences, but rather, that they pervade all decision-making in the brain, that comparison of valence is “the thing that” makes decisions. For example, the fourth reference I cited is a purely speculative article asserting the existence of “micro-valences” in low-importance rapid choices like which coffee mug to select from a cupboard. But perhaps the authors would say that these micro-valences are micro-consciously perceived.