A small comment about Normative Realism: From my reading, Wilfrid Sellars’ theory has a strong effect on Normative Realism. The idea went like this:
Agents are players in a game of “giving and asking reasons”. To be an agent is simply to follow the rules of the game. To not play the game would be either self-inconsistent, or be community-inconsistent. In either case, a group of agents can only do science if they are players of the game.
With this argument, he aimed to secure the “manifest image of man” against the “scientific image of man”. Namely, free will has to be implemented or simulated by APIs of the program.
Assuming that being able to do science is a necessary condition for dominance and power (in the Darwinian game of survival), we either meet agents, or beings who are so weak that we do not need to worry (shades of social Darwinism).
A small comment about Normative Realism: From my reading, Wilfrid Sellars’ theory has a strong effect on Normative Realism. The idea went like this:
Agents are players in a game of “giving and asking reasons”. To be an agent is simply to follow the rules of the game. To not play the game would be either self-inconsistent, or be community-inconsistent. In either case, a group of agents can only do science if they are players of the game.
With this argument, he aimed to secure the “manifest image of man” against the “scientific image of man”. Namely, free will has to be implemented or simulated by APIs of the program.
Assuming that being able to do science is a necessary condition for dominance and power (in the Darwinian game of survival), we either meet agents, or beings who are so weak that we do not need to worry (shades of social Darwinism).