Regarding the idea of “changing the future” invoked by the Majere quote:
The concept here relies upon some notion of causality. In order for it to be coherent, we have to think of the past and future as being determined—that if we knew both the state of the universe at a given time, and the laws of physics, we could calculate every other state the universe would ever have, or had ever had previously.
This conception doesn’t really seem to jive with what very, very little I know about many worlds and quantum mechanics, so it could be utterly false. That said, to understand the Majere quote, we have to refer to this particular conception, because it’s the one Majere’s assertion derives from.
The idea that we are “changing the future” comes from a formulation of the idea of free will. The basic idea is that, given the idea of a deterministic universe just established, the future is set, and all we do is watch it unfold from inside our heads. That is, except if we happen to be, as Majere thinks, creatures who possess Majere’s idea of free will.
In that case, we have the power to alter ourselves to a degree, and thus, alter the present state of the universe—and thereby, its future states. And further, this power is “free”—it is in no way influenced by causality. This last may seem impossible, and it probably is. But it’s the assumption which the idea of free will rests upon—that there is some force, usually asserted to be spiritual in nature, that is “above” the material world; by unspecified means, this force can alter the natural world without being causally determined by it. It’s outside of the system, so to speak, and yet able to interact on its own terms.
This idea, as I’ve said, seems absurd given our knowledge of physics. That said, it is clearly the one Majere assumes. It is by this conception that, given the same physical state of the world, we could not predict exactly what would happen next—for there is no telling what choices beings of free will may make, and indeed, if somehow the same creatures might come to the same state of the same universe a second time, they could theoretically choose something entirely different.
Regarding the idea of “changing the future” invoked by the Majere quote:
The concept here relies upon some notion of causality. In order for it to be coherent, we have to think of the past and future as being determined—that if we knew both the state of the universe at a given time, and the laws of physics, we could calculate every other state the universe would ever have, or had ever had previously.
This conception doesn’t really seem to jive with what very, very little I know about many worlds and quantum mechanics, so it could be utterly false. That said, to understand the Majere quote, we have to refer to this particular conception, because it’s the one Majere’s assertion derives from.
The idea that we are “changing the future” comes from a formulation of the idea of free will. The basic idea is that, given the idea of a deterministic universe just established, the future is set, and all we do is watch it unfold from inside our heads. That is, except if we happen to be, as Majere thinks, creatures who possess Majere’s idea of free will.
In that case, we have the power to alter ourselves to a degree, and thus, alter the present state of the universe—and thereby, its future states. And further, this power is “free”—it is in no way influenced by causality. This last may seem impossible, and it probably is. But it’s the assumption which the idea of free will rests upon—that there is some force, usually asserted to be spiritual in nature, that is “above” the material world; by unspecified means, this force can alter the natural world without being causally determined by it. It’s outside of the system, so to speak, and yet able to interact on its own terms.
This idea, as I’ve said, seems absurd given our knowledge of physics. That said, it is clearly the one Majere assumes. It is by this conception that, given the same physical state of the world, we could not predict exactly what would happen next—for there is no telling what choices beings of free will may make, and indeed, if somehow the same creatures might come to the same state of the same universe a second time, they could theoretically choose something entirely different.