Okay, I just think you seem to have some pretty radically different intuitions about what counts for someone’s well-being.
One other thing: you seem to be assuming that the only reasons someone can have to act are either
it promotes their well-being
some moral reason.
I think this isn’t true, and it’s especially not true if you’re defining well-being as you are. So you present the options for P as
they want to have the happy-making belief that the cube exists
they think there is something “good” about the cube existing
but these aren’t exhaustive: P could just want the cube to exist, not to produce mental states in themself or for a moral reason. If you’re now claiming that actually noone desires anything other than that they come to have certain mental states, that’s even more controversial, and I would say even more obviously false ;)
I said that there could be other reasons for P to want the cube to exist. If someone has a desire that fulfilling will not be good for them in any way, or good for any other sentient being, that’s fine but I do not think that a desire of this type is morally relevant in any way. Further if someone claimed to have such a desire, knowing that fulfilling it served no purpose other than simply fulfilling it, I would believe them to be confused about what desire is. Surely the desire would have to be at least causing them discomfort, or at least some sort of an urge to fulfill the desire. Without that, what does desire even mean?
But that doesn’t really have much to do with whether S is true. Like I said, It seems clearly true to me that identical mental states implies identical well-being, If you don’t agree, I don’t really have any way to convince you other than what I’ve already written.
Okay, I just think you seem to have some pretty radically different intuitions about what counts for someone’s well-being.
One other thing: you seem to be assuming that the only reasons someone can have to act are either
it promotes their well-being
some moral reason.
I think this isn’t true, and it’s especially not true if you’re defining well-being as you are. So you present the options for P as
they want to have the happy-making belief that the cube exists
they think there is something “good” about the cube existing
but these aren’t exhaustive: P could just want the cube to exist, not to produce mental states in themself or for a moral reason. If you’re now claiming that actually noone desires anything other than that they come to have certain mental states, that’s even more controversial, and I would say even more obviously false ;)
I said that there could be other reasons for P to want the cube to exist. If someone has a desire that fulfilling will not be good for them in any way, or good for any other sentient being, that’s fine but I do not think that a desire of this type is morally relevant in any way. Further if someone claimed to have such a desire, knowing that fulfilling it served no purpose other than simply fulfilling it, I would believe them to be confused about what desire is. Surely the desire would have to be at least causing them discomfort, or at least some sort of an urge to fulfill the desire. Without that, what does desire even mean?
But that doesn’t really have much to do with whether S is true. Like I said, It seems clearly true to me that identical mental states implies identical well-being, If you don’t agree, I don’t really have any way to convince you other than what I’ve already written.