As you’ve defined them, indifference is a razor-thin line—and I’d say we love each other, mostly.
But scalar “increases in utility” is not typically what our benevolence and malevolence responds to. If I care about positional status but also want other people to be happy independently of that, then there’s universal love and universal hate flowing from me alike. Is there an elegant rule distinguishing how utility changes in others are sorted into this? (The obvious things that come to mind don’t seem to really work.) And what can I do to convert status threats into sympathy (when appropriate, which let’s say it typically is?)
One thing I have noticed myself doing, which I think is a good thing, is thinking of the actual world as moving up or down in status relative to other possible worlds in response to its getting better or worse, and of my relative status as moving up or down with that. But I haven’t been doing this in a self-conscious way.
So, let’s assume your definitions, and also assume a Person X.
Person X likes to hit kids. They enjoy it. They may or may not think about how this decreases the utility of the kids: in fact if hitting kids causes their utility to go up or down, person X doesn’t care. They just like hitting kids.
I hate Person X, because I know they like to hit kids. I value kids and think hitting them is damaging, so when X’s utility goes up, mine goes down. So I hate X in just the way you say.
Note that Person X doesn’t hate the kids, by your definition. They aren’t concerned with the children’s utility at all; they are actually indifferent.
So your utility decreases when theirs increases. Say that your love or hate for the adult is L1, and your love or hate for the kid is L2. Utility change for each as a result of the adult hitting the kid is U1 for him and U2 for the kid.
If your utility decreases when he hits the kid, then all we’ve established is that -L2U2 > L1U1. You may love them both equally, but think that hitting the kid messes him up more than it makes the adult happy, you’d still be unhappy when the guy hits a kid. But we haven’t established that you hate the adult.
If the only thing that makes Person X happy is hitting kids, and you somehow find out that his utility function has increased directly, then you can infer from that that he’s hit a kid, and that makes you sad. However, this can happen even if you have a positive multiplier for his utility function in yours.
So I think your mistake is saying “I hate Person X, because I know they like to hit kids.” You might hate them, but the given definitions don’t force you to hate them just because they hit kids.
Put another way, you might not be happy if you heard that they had horrible back pain. You can care for someone, but not like what they’re doing.
(Your comment still deserves commendation for presenting an argument in that form.)
I am actually using James’ definition of hate, which is “When their utility function goes up, mine goes down.”
I suppose that, trivially, this is not entirely accurate of me and Person X. If Person X eats a sandwich and enjoys it, I don’t have a problem with that.
But if “hate” is unilateral in that fashion, no one loves or hates anyone: I have yet to encounter any individual who would, for instance, feel worse because someone else is enjoying a tasty sandwich. So instead, I used a more loosely defined variation on their definition, where “hate” can be allowed to occur on one axis of a person’s life and not another.
Under this variation, I can hate this person for hitting kids and not along other aspects of their life, which is normal. But hating that person isn’t evil, which is part of what I was getting at. I don’t feel happier if Person X gets utility from hitting kids, even if I would otherwise value Person X. And I don’t think it is evil to hate someone who gets their utility in a really messed-up way.
What might make this more difficult is that I am using a colloquial version of ‘evil’ but James’ particular formulation of ‘hate,’ which may make things confusing since I don’t think James’ definition of hate maps onto what we normally refer to as hate.
What are you trying to do with these definitions? The first three do a reasonable job of providing some explanation of what love means on a slightly simpler level than most people understand it.
However, the “love=good, hate=evil” can’t really be used like that. I don’t really see what you’re trying to say with that.
Also, I’d argue that love has more to do with signalling than your definition seems to imply.
What are you trying to do with these definitions?
Show how a tiny bit of economics can be used to provide definitions, consistent with many people’s understanding, of love, hate, good and evil. (I have provided these definitions to my intermediate microeconomics students.)
Evil, I believe, is taking pleasure in other peoples’ pain. I would exclude signaling concerns when deciding whether someone acted out of love.
So on your account, if I enjoy watching people suffer, but I nevertheless go out of my way to alleviate suffering in the world because I prefer people not suffer (thereby reducing my own pleasure), I’m evil? And if I don’t enjoy watching people suffer, but I go around causing suffering because I prefer that people suffer (again, thereby potentially reducing my own pleasure), I’m not evil?
So on your account, if I enjoy watching people suffer, but I nevertheless go out of my way to alleviate suffering in the world because I prefer people not suffer (thereby reducing my own pleasure), I’m evil?
Impossible since utility is that which you maximize or utility is measured by revealed preferences.
I’ll accept that definition of utility, but what does it have to do with enjoyment?
That is, OK, in this case I believe suffering has net negative utility, which explains my preferring to alleviate it. Am I somehow wrong, then, when I say I enjoy watching people suffer… I only think I enjoy it but I really don’t? Or what, exactly?
I should have written “Evil, I believe, is taking UTILITY in other peoples’ pain.”
Am I somehow wrong, then, when I say I enjoy watching people suffer… I only think I enjoy it but I really don’t?
From a rational actor microeconomic viewpoint this doesn’t make sense. But if you believe that enjoyment has some objective, physical basis in the brain then it just means you are mistaken.
Torturing a masochist with his consent isn’t evil. So you perhaps should have written “Evil, I believe, is taking UTILITY in other peoples’ DISUTILITY.” But then, the definition of evil equals your original definition of hate tautologically. Which may or may not be what you’ve intended.
I’ve made no claims about the basis for enjoyment, physical or otherwise, merely about my ability to recognize when I am enjoying something. But evidently the talk of enjoyment was a red herring to begin with, so I’m happy to drop it here.
So the more people that enjoy hurting you (an increase in their utility causing a decrease in your utility), the more evil you become (since you hate a larger number of people)? Did I misinterpret this?
Love—in increase in her utility causes an increase in your utility. Hate—in increase in her utility causes a decrease in your utility. Indifference—a change in her utility has no influence on your utility.
Love = good.
Hate = evil.
Indifference = how almost everyone feels towards almost everyone.
You make a compelling case that evil is a good thing (sometimes).
Love—in increase in her utility causes an increase in your utility.
Hate—in increase in her utility causes a decrease in your utility.
Indifference—a change in her utility has no influence on your utility.
Love = good.
Hate = evil.
Indifference = how almost everyone feels towards almost everyone.
As you’ve defined them, indifference is a razor-thin line—and I’d say we love each other, mostly.
But scalar “increases in utility” is not typically what our benevolence and malevolence responds to. If I care about positional status but also want other people to be happy independently of that, then there’s universal love and universal hate flowing from me alike. Is there an elegant rule distinguishing how utility changes in others are sorted into this? (The obvious things that come to mind don’t seem to really work.) And what can I do to convert status threats into sympathy (when appropriate, which let’s say it typically is?)
One thing I have noticed myself doing, which I think is a good thing, is thinking of the actual world as moving up or down in status relative to other possible worlds in response to its getting better or worse, and of my relative status as moving up or down with that. But I haven’t been doing this in a self-conscious way.
So, let’s assume your definitions, and also assume a Person X.
Person X likes to hit kids. They enjoy it. They may or may not think about how this decreases the utility of the kids: in fact if hitting kids causes their utility to go up or down, person X doesn’t care. They just like hitting kids.
I hate Person X, because I know they like to hit kids. I value kids and think hitting them is damaging, so when X’s utility goes up, mine goes down. So I hate X in just the way you say.
Note that Person X doesn’t hate the kids, by your definition. They aren’t concerned with the children’s utility at all; they are actually indifferent.
But I hate Person X. Which makes me the evil one.
That does not add up to normality.
I’m almost certain that “don’t” is not intended.
Edited. Thanks.
You’re confusing a few different issues here.
So your utility decreases when theirs increases. Say that your love or hate for the adult is L1, and your love or hate for the kid is L2. Utility change for each as a result of the adult hitting the kid is U1 for him and U2 for the kid.
If your utility decreases when he hits the kid, then all we’ve established is that -L2U2 > L1U1. You may love them both equally, but think that hitting the kid messes him up more than it makes the adult happy, you’d still be unhappy when the guy hits a kid. But we haven’t established that you hate the adult.
If the only thing that makes Person X happy is hitting kids, and you somehow find out that his utility function has increased directly, then you can infer from that that he’s hit a kid, and that makes you sad. However, this can happen even if you have a positive multiplier for his utility function in yours.
So I think your mistake is saying “I hate Person X, because I know they like to hit kids.” You might hate them, but the given definitions don’t force you to hate them just because they hit kids.
Put another way, you might not be happy if you heard that they had horrible back pain. You can care for someone, but not like what they’re doing.
(Your comment still deserves commendation for presenting an argument in that form.)
I am actually using James’ definition of hate, which is “When their utility function goes up, mine goes down.”
I suppose that, trivially, this is not entirely accurate of me and Person X. If Person X eats a sandwich and enjoys it, I don’t have a problem with that.
But if “hate” is unilateral in that fashion, no one loves or hates anyone: I have yet to encounter any individual who would, for instance, feel worse because someone else is enjoying a tasty sandwich. So instead, I used a more loosely defined variation on their definition, where “hate” can be allowed to occur on one axis of a person’s life and not another.
Under this variation, I can hate this person for hitting kids and not along other aspects of their life, which is normal. But hating that person isn’t evil, which is part of what I was getting at. I don’t feel happier if Person X gets utility from hitting kids, even if I would otherwise value Person X. And I don’t think it is evil to hate someone who gets their utility in a really messed-up way.
What might make this more difficult is that I am using a colloquial version of ‘evil’ but James’ particular formulation of ‘hate,’ which may make things confusing since I don’t think James’ definition of hate maps onto what we normally refer to as hate.
What are you trying to do with these definitions? The first three do a reasonable job of providing some explanation of what love means on a slightly simpler level than most people understand it.
However, the “love=good, hate=evil” can’t really be used like that. I don’t really see what you’re trying to say with that.
Also, I’d argue that love has more to do with signalling than your definition seems to imply.
Evil, I believe, is taking pleasure in other peoples’ pain. I would exclude signaling concerns when deciding whether someone acted out of love.
Huh.
So on your account, if I enjoy watching people suffer, but I nevertheless go out of my way to alleviate suffering in the world because I prefer people not suffer (thereby reducing my own pleasure), I’m evil? And if I don’t enjoy watching people suffer, but I go around causing suffering because I prefer that people suffer (again, thereby potentially reducing my own pleasure), I’m not evil?
Did I get that right?
Impossible since utility is that which you maximize or utility is measured by revealed preferences.
I’ll accept that definition of utility, but what does it have to do with enjoyment?
That is, OK, in this case I believe suffering has net negative utility, which explains my preferring to alleviate it. Am I somehow wrong, then, when I say I enjoy watching people suffer… I only think I enjoy it but I really don’t? Or what, exactly?
I should have written “Evil, I believe, is taking UTILITY in other peoples’ pain.”
From a rational actor microeconomic viewpoint this doesn’t make sense. But if you believe that enjoyment has some objective, physical basis in the brain then it just means you are mistaken.
Torturing a masochist with his consent isn’t evil. So you perhaps should have written “Evil, I believe, is taking UTILITY in other peoples’ DISUTILITY.” But then, the definition of evil equals your original definition of hate tautologically. Which may or may not be what you’ve intended.
I’ve made no claims about the basis for enjoyment, physical or otherwise, merely about my ability to recognize when I am enjoying something. But evidently the talk of enjoyment was a red herring to begin with, so I’m happy to drop it here.
No, the word for that is sadism. Evil is about how you judge a person(’s actions, motivations etc), not purely about their experience/values.
So the more people that enjoy hurting you (an increase in their utility causing a decrease in your utility), the more evil you become (since you hate a larger number of people)? Did I misinterpret this?
You make a compelling case that evil is a good thing (sometimes).