First, how is average utilitarian defined in a non-circular way? I’m trying to wrap my head around why I don’t agree with the conclusions of the first post I linked, and it seems to come down to not understanding average utilitarians.
More specifically, do they define two levels of utility? Or do they exclude themselves from the calculation? I thought it was just a different way of allocating your own utility, but how do you calculate which way will give you the most utility by giving the world a greater average utility, without knowing the answer of your own utility to plug in?
I will be extremely impressed if Less Wrong solves this one.
Has he been officially “impressed” yet? Should I read any specific attempts to solve the trilemma? What reading can I do on anthropics to get an idea of the major ideas in the field?
It seems to me that SIA, in the way it’s been applied, is obviously correct, and in general I feel like I have very clear intuitions on these kind of problems. I plan on writing up something eventually, after I understand the argument against my point-of-view to argue coherently.
First, how is average utilitarian defined in a non-circular way?
If you can quantify a proto-utility across some set of moral patients (i.e. some thing that is measurable for each thing/person we care about), then you can then call your utility the average of proto-utility over moral patients. For example, you could define your set of moral patients to be the set of humans, and each human’s proto-utility to be the amount of money they have, then average by summing the money and dividing by the number of humans.
I don’t necessarily endorse that approach, of course.
Has he been officially “impressed” yet?
I think Eliezer says he’s still confused about anthropics.
What reading can I do on anthropics to get an idea of the major ideas in the field?
So far as I know, Nick Bostrom’s book is the orthodox foremost work in the field. You can read it immediately for free here. Personally, I would guess that absorbing UDT and updateless thinking is the best marginal thing you can do to make progress on anthropics, but that’s probably not even a majority opinion on LW, let alone among anthropics scholars.
I was thinking about anthropics after seeing some posts here about it. I read the series of posts on ADT including http://lesswrong.com/r/discussion/lw/8aw/anthropic_decision_theory_iv_solving_selfish_and/, and EY’s posts http://lesswrong.com/lw/17c/outlawing_anthropics_an_updateless_dilemma/, http://lesswrong.com/lw/19d/the_anthropic_trilemma/, and http://lesswrong.com/lw/17d/forcing_anthropics_boltzmann_brains/. I had a few questions about those posts.
First, how is average utilitarian defined in a non-circular way? I’m trying to wrap my head around why I don’t agree with the conclusions of the first post I linked, and it seems to come down to not understanding average utilitarians.
More specifically, do they define two levels of utility? Or do they exclude themselves from the calculation? I thought it was just a different way of allocating your own utility, but how do you calculate which way will give you the most utility by giving the world a greater average utility, without knowing the answer of your own utility to plug in?
Second, in http://lesswrong.com/lw/19d/the_anthropic_trilemma/ EY ended off with
Has he been officially “impressed” yet? Should I read any specific attempts to solve the trilemma? What reading can I do on anthropics to get an idea of the major ideas in the field?
It seems to me that SIA, in the way it’s been applied, is obviously correct, and in general I feel like I have very clear intuitions on these kind of problems. I plan on writing up something eventually, after I understand the argument against my point-of-view to argue coherently.
If you can quantify a proto-utility across some set of moral patients (i.e. some thing that is measurable for each thing/person we care about), then you can then call your utility the average of proto-utility over moral patients. For example, you could define your set of moral patients to be the set of humans, and each human’s proto-utility to be the amount of money they have, then average by summing the money and dividing by the number of humans.
I don’t necessarily endorse that approach, of course.
I think Eliezer says he’s still confused about anthropics.
So far as I know, Nick Bostrom’s book is the orthodox foremost work in the field. You can read it immediately for free here. Personally, I would guess that absorbing UDT and updateless thinking is the best marginal thing you can do to make progress on anthropics, but that’s probably not even a majority opinion on LW, let alone among anthropics scholars.
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