I think most people haven’t been tortured very much, but those that endure terrible pain regularly are often willing to give up almost anything to make it stop. (This isn’t universal. Nietzsche was enduring terrible pain nearly constantly in his later life, and he would agree with you.)
I think it’s easy for someone to say “the meaning in the world outweighs even terrible suffering on an massive scale” when they’re not the one experiencing the nearly constant suffering.
That said, I’ll add to the (incomplete) list of uncertainties “how exactly does the axiological value of meaning relate to the axiological value of suffering?”
Or to to put it another way, a part of me definitely resonates with...
I think it’s worth being a good part of a bad story, rather than there being no story at all.
Indeed, most of the personal meaning in my life is grounded in my choice of the role that I play in this this small part of the whole story of civilization. I don’t decide my circumstances, but I do decide what sort of person I chose to be in meeting those circumstances. I am proud to choose the Good, and that is most of what is personally valuable to me.[1]
But I’m suspicious that the reason why “I think it’s worth being a good part of a bad story” feels appealing as a justification for existence is scope insensitivity.
I just literally cannot comprehend the horror of the terror and the suffering of billions of years of life killing and eating life on planet earth. If I could comprehend it, if I experienced it all myself, I think it would be extremely and straightforwardly obvious that the tiny fraction of total experience in which I could contextualize the whole thing as part of an epic story doesn’t come even remotely close to justifying the horror, and any claims to the contrary are cope.
As a side note, this is related I have a strong dislike of John Wentworth’s recent categorization of human values vs Goodness.
I do not resonate with his formulation of what Goodness is. Goodness, as I mean it definitively not “conformity to local norms”. In fact, goodness depends on non-conformity, insofar as local norms are often and regularly evil. Goodness is something like the reflective unfolding of a small number of innate principles, like fairness and kindness, which are tied to strong, innate, moral emotional reactions.
And this matters a lot to me because my relationship to Goodness is probably the largest component of what I find yummy.
I think most people haven’t been tortured very much, but those that endure terrible pain regularly are often willing to give up almost anything to make it stop. (This isn’t universal. Nietzsche was enduring terrible pain nearly constantly in his later life, and he would agree with you.)
I think it’s easy for someone to say “the meaning in the world outweighs even terrible suffering on an massive scale” when they’re not the one experiencing the nearly constant suffering.
That said, I’ll add to the (incomplete) list of uncertainties “how exactly does the axiological value of meaning relate to the axiological value of suffering?”
Or to to put it another way, a part of me definitely resonates with...
Indeed, most of the personal meaning in my life is grounded in my choice of the role that I play in this this small part of the whole story of civilization. I don’t decide my circumstances, but I do decide what sort of person I chose to be in meeting those circumstances. I am proud to choose the Good, and that is most of what is personally valuable to me.[1]
But I’m suspicious that the reason why “I think it’s worth being a good part of a bad story” feels appealing as a justification for existence is scope insensitivity.
I just literally cannot comprehend the horror of the terror and the suffering of billions of years of life killing and eating life on planet earth. If I could comprehend it, if I experienced it all myself, I think it would be extremely and straightforwardly obvious that the tiny fraction of total experience in which I could contextualize the whole thing as part of an epic story doesn’t come even remotely close to justifying the horror, and any claims to the contrary are cope.
As a side note, this is related I have a strong dislike of John Wentworth’s recent categorization of human values vs Goodness.
I do not resonate with his formulation of what Goodness is. Goodness, as I mean it definitively not “conformity to local norms”. In fact, goodness depends on non-conformity, insofar as local norms are often and regularly evil. Goodness is something like the reflective unfolding of a small number of innate principles, like fairness and kindness, which are tied to strong, innate, moral emotional reactions.
And this matters a lot to me because my relationship to Goodness is probably the largest component of what I find yummy.