Looking down the decision tree, Putin might find it in his self-interest to use nuclear weapons. If given enough weapons, Ukraine might be able to resist a Russian invasion. Putin suffering a clear loss in Ukraine combined with the sanctions imposed on him might cause his inner circle to try to kill him. Putin, to save his own life, might use a strategy of dropping a tactical nuclear weapon somewhere to send a warning to the west that they better stop interfering in Ukraine and stop sanctioning Russia.
The main problem is that absent nuclear weapons Putin would lose in Ukraine because of all the support Ukraine would get from countries collectively much richer than Russia. Putin is therefore relying on nuclear weapons to win, but many in the west don’t seem sufficiently afraid of nuclear war and support giving massive lethal aid to Ukraine. Some formally serious people have proposed that NATO create a no-fly zone over Ukraine.
There is this problem that giving up whenever someone threatens to use nukes, gives them an incentive to threaten to use nukes more often.
Like, yesterday it was “obviously the nukes would fly if someone attacked Russia”, today it is “but maybe nukes will also fly if someone keeps supporting Ukraine defending itself from Russian attack”, now feel free to extrapolate for tomorrow...
EDIT:
Problem is, this is an iterated conflict. I suppose no one here believes that a deal like “okay, Russia may take the whole Ukraine now, but then promises to not invade another country for at least 20 years” is actually on the table. (For the same reason it wasn’t with Germany in 1938.)
Yes, if the outcome is “the nukes actually start flying”, then we may all die. That would be very bad. But at the same time, if the outcome is “Putin mentions nukes, everyone gives up, Putin takes whatever he wants”, then it is trivial to predict what Putin will say during his next invasion.
I agree, although as an American I note that Russia’s conventional army is far to weak to take countries of strategic significance to the United States. Sometimes the best solution is to give in to the blackmail, especially if the blackmailer has put himself in a position where it will likely be in his interest to carry out his threat if you do not give in.
Hypothetically, is there a chance to give in now, without making it a precedent? I think history shows that agreements with Russia are not worth the paper they are written on.
If you look at the Wikipedia page (and Wikipedia pages are generally written to support the Western elite perspective) for the agreement, the US broke the agreement first in 2013 before Russia violated it.
Certainly, this example shows that agreements with Russia that the US violates are not binding to Russian decision-makers.
USA screwed up by acting legibly. (I don’t buy the story that Belarus spontaneously became a pro-Russian dictatorship with zero intervention from Russia.)
Where did you hear that Belarus got spontaneously pro-Russian?
There’s no claim that there’s zero intervention anywhere and the agreement does not call for zero intervention. I would expect that there is not a single state that has zero intervention from the United States.
The agreement does forbid using military force and also economic sanctions against Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan and the US violated it by imposing economic sanctions against Belarus.
Within a few months from that point, this then increased Russian demands on Ukraine not signing the European Union–Ukraine Association Agreement and the Ukrainian leader ruling out signing the agreement. Then partly with Western support, there were protests that toppled his government. The new government was then not recognized by Russia and Russia felt the need to intervene militarily.
That isn’t to say, that Russia’s actions are good. They are however far unprovoked or happen in an environment where Russia fails to honor agreements when other parties honor them.
Germany in 1938 had the economic and military strength that it would have won a war against all the other European powers if it hadn’t attacked Russia and the US wouldn’t get involved.
Both the economic and military strength of Russia are quite different.
Putin has room for not suffering a clear loss. Ukraine has a lot of incentive to agree to a deal to end the war to avoid their country being destroyed further.
If Putin thinks that he would lose on the battlefield if the war drags out, he could offer an end to the war in exchange for Donbas, Luhansk, and Crimea. Putin has enough firepower to level Kyiv to the ground if the deal would be rejected.
Say Putin is considering dropping a tactical nuclear weapon in an unoccupied part of a European NATO country with the message “1,000 more will follow if you don’t end sanctions and stop interfering in Ukraine.” If Putin is entirely self-interested he might take this option if he believes it gives him, say, a 30% chance of staying alive and in power if he thinks that otherwise there is a higher chance he will be killed by his inner circle so the inner circle can keep power by appointing someone else to lead Russia, leave Ukraine, and blame everything on the now dead Putin.
If Putin thinks that part of his inner circle is against him I would expect him to rather follow Stalin’s playbook than make moves for nuclear war. In many situations, preparing for a nuclear strike might send signals to his inner circle that the situation isn’t stable.
As far as the game dynamics go, it’s pretty dangerous for a dictator to send his inner circle a signal that the dictator believes that he has only a 30% chance of success because that means that his inner circle has to plan for securing their power in the absence of the dictator.
Two former leaders of Russia (sensu lato) are living near Moscow in peaceful retirement:
Gorbachev, who turned 90 this year, is now largely confined to his residence on a plot of government land near the Moscow homes of former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and other prominent officials and celebrities. He rarely gives interviews, his assistant and former interpreter Pavel Palazhchenko told RFE/RL.
And none of the leaders of the Soviet Union met a violent end.
Does it seem possible (probable?) that his inner circle would defend their power like this? Or, is there any kind of sign/indication that this could happen? I mean, it is indeed something that one can imagine but I don’t know if there is any sign pointing in this direction.
The invasion of Ukraine itself might be a sign, if you consider the invasion to be against Russia’s interest Perhaps Putin was concerned he would lose power so he started a war to shore up his support.
Looking down the decision tree, Putin might find it in his self-interest to use nuclear weapons. If given enough weapons, Ukraine might be able to resist a Russian invasion. Putin suffering a clear loss in Ukraine combined with the sanctions imposed on him might cause his inner circle to try to kill him. Putin, to save his own life, might use a strategy of dropping a tactical nuclear weapon somewhere to send a warning to the west that they better stop interfering in Ukraine and stop sanctioning Russia.
The main problem is that absent nuclear weapons Putin would lose in Ukraine because of all the support Ukraine would get from countries collectively much richer than Russia. Putin is therefore relying on nuclear weapons to win, but many in the west don’t seem sufficiently afraid of nuclear war and support giving massive lethal aid to Ukraine. Some formally serious people have proposed that NATO create a no-fly zone over Ukraine.
There is this problem that giving up whenever someone threatens to use nukes, gives them an incentive to threaten to use nukes more often.
Like, yesterday it was “obviously the nukes would fly if someone attacked Russia”, today it is “but maybe nukes will also fly if someone keeps supporting Ukraine defending itself from Russian attack”, now feel free to extrapolate for tomorrow...
EDIT:
Problem is, this is an iterated conflict. I suppose no one here believes that a deal like “okay, Russia may take the whole Ukraine now, but then promises to not invade another country for at least 20 years” is actually on the table. (For the same reason it wasn’t with Germany in 1938.)
Yes, if the outcome is “the nukes actually start flying”, then we may all die. That would be very bad. But at the same time, if the outcome is “Putin mentions nukes, everyone gives up, Putin takes whatever he wants”, then it is trivial to predict what Putin will say during his next invasion.
I agree, although as an American I note that Russia’s conventional army is far to weak to take countries of strategic significance to the United States. Sometimes the best solution is to give in to the blackmail, especially if the blackmailer has put himself in a position where it will likely be in his interest to carry out his threat if you do not give in.
Hypothetically, is there a chance to give in now, without making it a precedent? I think history shows that agreements with Russia are not worth the paper they are written on.
If you look at the Wikipedia page (and Wikipedia pages are generally written to support the Western elite perspective) for the agreement, the US broke the agreement first in 2013 before Russia violated it.
Certainly, this example shows that agreements with Russia that the US violates are not binding to Russian decision-makers.
USA screwed up by acting legibly. (I don’t buy the story that Belarus spontaneously became a pro-Russian dictatorship with zero intervention from Russia.)
Where did you hear that Belarus got spontaneously pro-Russian?
There’s no claim that there’s zero intervention anywhere and the agreement does not call for zero intervention. I would expect that there is not a single state that has zero intervention from the United States.
The agreement does forbid using military force and also economic sanctions against Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan and the US violated it by imposing economic sanctions against Belarus.
Within a few months from that point, this then increased Russian demands on Ukraine not signing the European Union–Ukraine Association Agreement and the Ukrainian leader ruling out signing the agreement. Then partly with Western support, there were protests that toppled his government. The new government was then not recognized by Russia and Russia felt the need to intervene militarily.
That isn’t to say, that Russia’s actions are good. They are however far unprovoked or happen in an environment where Russia fails to honor agreements when other parties honor them.
Germany in 1938 had the economic and military strength that it would have won a war against all the other European powers if it hadn’t attacked Russia and the US wouldn’t get involved.
Both the economic and military strength of Russia are quite different.
This sounds like a very important factor indeed.
Putin has room for not suffering a clear loss. Ukraine has a lot of incentive to agree to a deal to end the war to avoid their country being destroyed further.
If Putin thinks that he would lose on the battlefield if the war drags out, he could offer an end to the war in exchange for Donbas, Luhansk, and Crimea. Putin has enough firepower to level Kyiv to the ground if the deal would be rejected.
Can you elaborate on this?
Say Putin is considering dropping a tactical nuclear weapon in an unoccupied part of a European NATO country with the message “1,000 more will follow if you don’t end sanctions and stop interfering in Ukraine.” If Putin is entirely self-interested he might take this option if he believes it gives him, say, a 30% chance of staying alive and in power if he thinks that otherwise there is a higher chance he will be killed by his inner circle so the inner circle can keep power by appointing someone else to lead Russia, leave Ukraine, and blame everything on the now dead Putin.
If Putin thinks that part of his inner circle is against him I would expect him to rather follow Stalin’s playbook than make moves for nuclear war. In many situations, preparing for a nuclear strike might send signals to his inner circle that the situation isn’t stable.
As far as the game dynamics go, it’s pretty dangerous for a dictator to send his inner circle a signal that the dictator believes that he has only a 30% chance of success because that means that his inner circle has to plan for securing their power in the absence of the dictator.
Two former leaders of Russia (sensu lato) are living near Moscow in peaceful retirement:
And none of the leaders of the Soviet Union met a violent end.
Does it seem possible (probable?) that his inner circle would defend their power like this? Or, is there any kind of sign/indication that this could happen? I mean, it is indeed something that one can imagine but I don’t know if there is any sign pointing in this direction.
The invasion of Ukraine itself might be a sign, if you consider the invasion to be against Russia’s interest Perhaps Putin was concerned he would lose power so he started a war to shore up his support.