I think you might be grossly misreading Godel’s incompleteness theorem. Specifically, it proves that a formal system is either incomplete or inconsistent. You have not addressed the possibility that minds are in fact inconsistent/make moves that are symbolically describable but unjustifiable (which generate falsehoods)
We know both happen.
The question then is what to do with inconsistent mind.
Thanks for meaningfully engaging with the argument — it’s rare and genuinely appreciated.
Edit: You’re right that Gödel’s theorem allows for both incompleteness and inconsistency — and minds are clearly inconsistent in many ways. But the argument of Eliminative Nominalism (EN) doesn’t assume minds are consistent; it claims that even if they were, they would still be incomplete when modeling themselves.
Also, evolution acts as a filtering process — selecting for regulatory systems that tend toward internal consistency, because inconsistent regulators are maladaptive. We see this in edge cases too: under LSD (global perturbation = inconsistency), we observe ego dissolution and loss of qualia at higher doses. In contrast, severe brain injuries (e.g., hemispherectomy) often preserve the sense of self and continuity — suggesting that extending a formal system (while preserving its consistency) renders it incomplete, and thus qualia persists. (in the essay)
That’s exactly why EN is a strong theory: it’s falsifiable. If a system could model its own consciousness formally and completely, EN would be wrong.
EN is the first falsifiable theory of consciousness.
I think you might be grossly misreading Godel’s incompleteness theorem. Specifically, it proves that a formal system is either incomplete or inconsistent. You have not addressed the possibility that minds are in fact inconsistent/make moves that are symbolically describable but unjustifiable (which generate falsehoods)
We know both happen.
The question then is what to do with inconsistent mind.
Thanks for meaningfully engaging with the argument — it’s rare and genuinely appreciated.
Edit: You’re right that Gödel’s theorem allows for both incompleteness and inconsistency — and minds are clearly inconsistent in many ways. But the argument of Eliminative Nominalism (EN) doesn’t assume minds are consistent; it claims that even if they were, they would still be incomplete when modeling themselves.
Also, evolution acts as a filtering process — selecting for regulatory systems that tend toward internal consistency, because inconsistent regulators are maladaptive. We see this in edge cases too: under LSD (global perturbation = inconsistency), we observe ego dissolution and loss of qualia at higher doses. In contrast, severe brain injuries (e.g., hemispherectomy) often preserve the sense of self and continuity — suggesting that extending a formal system (while preserving its consistency) renders it incomplete, and thus qualia persists. (in the essay)
That’s exactly why EN is a strong theory: it’s falsifiable. If a system could model its own consciousness formally and completely, EN would be wrong.
EN is the first falsifiable theory of consciousness.