Thanks for meaningfully engaging with the argument — it’s rare and genuinely appreciated.
Edit: You’re right that Gödel’s theorem allows for both incompleteness and inconsistency — and minds are clearly inconsistent in many ways. But the argument of Eliminative Nominalism (EN) doesn’t assume minds are consistent; it claims that even if they were, they would still be incomplete when modeling themselves.
Also, evolution acts as a filtering process — selecting for regulatory systems that tend toward internal consistency, because inconsistent regulators are maladaptive. We see this in edge cases too: under LSD (global perturbation = inconsistency), we observe ego dissolution and loss of qualia at higher doses. In contrast, severe brain injuries (e.g., hemispherectomy) often preserve the sense of self and continuity — suggesting that extending a formal system (while preserving its consistency) renders it incomplete, and thus qualia persists. (in the essay)
That’s exactly why EN is a strong theory: it’s falsifiable. If a system could model its own consciousness formally and completely, EN would be wrong.
EN is the first falsifiable theory of consciousness.
Thanks for meaningfully engaging with the argument — it’s rare and genuinely appreciated.
Edit: You’re right that Gödel’s theorem allows for both incompleteness and inconsistency — and minds are clearly inconsistent in many ways. But the argument of Eliminative Nominalism (EN) doesn’t assume minds are consistent; it claims that even if they were, they would still be incomplete when modeling themselves.
Also, evolution acts as a filtering process — selecting for regulatory systems that tend toward internal consistency, because inconsistent regulators are maladaptive. We see this in edge cases too: under LSD (global perturbation = inconsistency), we observe ego dissolution and loss of qualia at higher doses. In contrast, severe brain injuries (e.g., hemispherectomy) often preserve the sense of self and continuity — suggesting that extending a formal system (while preserving its consistency) renders it incomplete, and thus qualia persists. (in the essay)
That’s exactly why EN is a strong theory: it’s falsifiable. If a system could model its own consciousness formally and completely, EN would be wrong.
EN is the first falsifiable theory of consciousness.