So on atheism, it’s really hard to see how Beth 2 people could possibly exist. But if fewer than Beth 2 people exist, then 0% of possible people exist, which would make the odds of my existence in particular zero. I’m not special—if 0% of possible people exist, it’s ridiculously unlikely I’d be one of the lucky few that exist.
This has been discussed on LessWrong several times recently, but you’re you’re using the wrong denominator when deciding that your existence in particular is unlikely compared to all other humans.
On way to demonstrate this: If I flip 256 coins, the probability that I get HTTTTTTTHTTHHTTTHTTTHTHTHTTHHTTTTTTHHHTHTTHTTTHHTTTTHTHTHHHHHTTTTHTHHHHTHHHHHHHTTTTHHTHHHTHTTTTTHTTTHTTHHHTHHHTHHTHTHTHTHTHHTHTHTTHTHHTTHTHTTHHHHHTTTTTTHHTHTTTTTHHTHHTTHTTHHTTTHTTHTHTTHHHTTHHHTHTTHHTTHTTTHTHHHTHHTHHHHTHHTHHHTHHHHTTHTTHTHHTHTTHTHHTTHHTTHHTH is so small that I’m (much) more likely to randomly select a particular particle in the universe than to happen to get that sequence of heads/tails, but I’m not an all-powerful God who flips unbelievably many coins; I only ran my coin-flipping script once (ok, like 3 times because my script had subtle errors).
Other recent posts have covered this better and in more detail, but I can’t find them at the moment.
The cases are non-symmetrical because a big universe makes my existence more likely but it doesn’t make me more likely to get HTTTTTTTHTTHHTTTHTTTHTHTHTTHHTTTTTTHHHTHTTHTTTHHTTTTHTHTHHHHHTTTTHTHHHHTHHHHHHHTTTTHHTHHHTHTTTTTHTTTHTTHHHTHHHTHHTHTHTHTHTHHTHTHTTHTHHTTHTHTTHHHHHTTTTTTHHTHTTTTTHHTHHTTHTTHHTTTHTTHTHTTHHHTTHHHTHTTHHTTHTTTHTHHHTHHTHHHHTHHTHHHTHHHHTTHTTHTHHTHTTHTHHTTHHTTHHTH. The most specific version of the evidence is I get those sequence of coin flips, which is unaffected by the number of people, rather than that someone does that. My view follows trivially from the widely adopted SIA which I argued for in the piece—it doesn’t rely on some basic math error.
This has been discussed on LessWrong several times recently, but you’re you’re using the wrong denominator when deciding that your existence in particular is unlikely compared to all other humans.
On way to demonstrate this: If I flip 256 coins, the probability that I get
HTTTTTTTHTTHHTTTHTTTHTHTHTTHHTTTTTTHHHTHTTHTTTHHTTTTHTHTHHHHHTTTTHTHHHHTHHHHHHHTTTTHHTHHHTHTTTTTHTTTHTTHHHTHHHTHHTHTHTHTHTHHTHTHTTHTHHTTHTHTTHHHHHTTTTTTHHTHTTTTTHHTHHTTHTTHHTTTHTTHTHTTHHHTTHHHTHTTHHTTHTTTHTHHHTHHTHHHHTHHTHHHTHHHHTTHTTHTHHTHTTHTHHTTHHTTHHTHis so small that I’m (much) more likely to randomly select a particular particle in the universe than to happen to get that sequence of heads/tails, but I’m not an all-powerful God who flips unbelievably many coins; I only ran my coin-flipping script once (ok, like 3 times because my script had subtle errors).Other recent posts have covered this better and in more detail, but I can’t find them at the moment.
The cases are non-symmetrical because a big universe makes my existence more likely but it doesn’t make me more likely to get HTTTTTTTHTTHHTTTHTTTHTHTHTTHHTTTTTTHHHTHTTHTTTHHTTTTHTHTHHHHHTTTTHTHHHHTHHHHHHHTTTTHHTHHHTHTTTTTHTTTHTTHHHTHHHTHHTHTHTHTHTHHTHTHTTHTHHTTHTHTTHHHHHTTTTTTHHTHTTTTTHHTHHTTHTTHHTTTHTTHTHTTHHHTTHHHTHTTHHTTHTTTHTHHHTHHTHHHHTHHTHHHTHHHHTTHTTHTHHTHTTHTHHTTHHTTHHTH. The most specific version of the evidence is I get those sequence of coin flips, which is unaffected by the number of people, rather than that someone does that. My view follows trivially from the widely adopted SIA which I argued for in the piece—it doesn’t rely on some basic math error.