1 Due to entanglement, there can be spacelike separated measurements such that there exists a reference frame where it looks like measurement A precedes and has a causal influence on the outcomes of measurement B, and also a reference frame where it looks like measurement B precedes and has a causal influence on the outcomes of measurement A.

If the traditional idea of causality is an asymmetric a->B relationship , then entanglement doesn’t look like causality.

Why is mathematics so (unreasonably) effective in the natural sciences?

In important ways, it isn’t: a mathematical truth is not per se a physical truth.

How can the Continuum Hypothesis be independent of the ZFC axioms?

Why not? There’s no guarantee that any set of axioms should solve every problem.

Is there a really good reason to believe or not believe one of the following theories of consciousness? (I think I find b most likely.) (I do not consider epiphenomenalism a serious option anymore, basically due to the arguments described here.) (I don’t really consider c a very serious option either.)

Everything is physical—consciousness isn’t fundamental. (Basic response—I feel like any attempt to describe consciousness in terms of physical phenomena will be missing something.)

Arguments: phsyicalism is generally succesful.
Counterarguments: hard problem, irreducubillity, Mary’s room.

Consciousness is fundamental. Conscious experiences are caused by physical processes, and have effects on physical processes in return. (Basic response—it seems a little absurd to believe that the Standard Model makes incorrect predictions in the brain because consciousness intervenes. It feels even more absurd to imagine there is any reasonable answer to the question, “How fast can physical processes affect consciousness, and how fast can consciousness affect physical processes?”)

Arguments: same as the counterarguments to physicalism.
Counterarguments: parsimony, physical closure, interaction.

What are we really doing when we talk about counterfactuals? Is there any actually principled way to consider them? If not, why does nothing go wrong in our standard use-cases for counterfactuals?

Rationalists think of counterfactuals in terms of the behaviour of agents and Newcomb’s paradox. Whereas, the mainstream view is that counterfactual is a “what if”, or path not taken—not necessarily involving agents at all. On the mainstream view, the five numbers that did no come up on the die are counterfactuals.

Rationalists have problems with counterfactuals that the mainstream does not. This immediately suggests that rationalists can solve their problems by adopting the mainstream view.

In the mainstream view, counterfactuals are ott defined in terms of free will, only probability. Which is to say, that as far as everyone who is not a Yudowskian rationalist is concerned,counterfactuals aren’t defined in terms of free will, only probability.

Counterfactuals are defined in terms of probability, but not of objective probability. Subjective probability is always available because subjects have limited knowledge..so subjective counterfactuals are always available.

Whether there is a “principled” way of handling them depends on your principles. Assume determinism and omniscience, and you’ll have problems.

If the traditional idea of causality is an asymmetric a->B relationship , then entanglement

doesn’tlook like causality.Why is mathematics so (unreasonably) effective in the natural sciences?

In important ways, it isn’t: a mathematical truth is not per se a physical truth.

Why not? There’s no guarantee that any set of axioms should solve every problem.

Arguments: phsyicalism is generally succesful. Counterarguments: hard problem, irreducubillity, Mary’s room.

Arguments: same as the counterarguments to physicalism. Counterarguments: parsimony, physical closure, interaction.

Rationalists think of counterfactuals in terms of the behaviour of agents and Newcomb’s paradox. Whereas, the mainstream view is that counterfactual is a “what if”, or path not taken—not necessarily involving agents at all. On the mainstream view, the five numbers that did no come up on the die are counterfactuals.

Rationalists have problems with counterfactuals that the mainstream does not. This immediately suggests that rationalists can solve their problems by adopting the mainstream view.

In the mainstream view, counterfactuals are ott defined in terms of free will, only probability. Which is to say, that

as far as everyone who is not a Yudowskian rationalistis concerned,counterfactuals aren’t defined in terms of free will, only probability.Counterfactuals are defined in terms of probability, but not of objective probability. Subjective probability is always available because subjects have limited knowledge..so subjective counterfactuals are always available.

Whether there is a “principled” way of handling them depends on your principles. Assume determinism

andomniscience, and you’ll have problems.