What Parfit argued is that, given any possible world, there is a better world with a larger population and a lower quality of life (according to most people’s definitions of “better”). There is even a better world with a much larger population and a quality of life that is barely above zero. It sounds like you agree, but you’re just noting that the higher-population, lower-quality-of-life, better world also differs in other ways; in particular, it has more resources.
My understanding of Parfit is that he believed the Mere Addition Paradox showed that a world that differed in no other way besides having a larger population size and a lower quality of life was better than one with a smaller population and a higher quality of life. That’s why it’s called the Mere Addition Paradox, because you arrive at the Paradox by adding more people, redistributing resources, and doing nothing else. That is what I understand to be the Repugnant Conclusion. What makes it especially repugnant is that it implies that people in the here and now have a duty to overpopulate the world.
You seem to have understood the Repugnant Conclusion to be the belief that there is any possible society that has a larger population and lower quality of life than another society, but is also better than that society. To avoid quibbling over which of us has an accurate understanding of the topic I’ll just call my understanding of it RC1 and your understanding RC2.
I do not accept RC1. According to RC1 a world with a high population and low quality of life is better than a world that has the same amount of resources as the first world, a lower population, and a higher quality of life. I do not accept this. To me the second world is clearly better.
I might accept RC2. If I get your meaning RC2 means that there is always a better population that is larger and with lower quality of life, but it might have to be quite a bit larger and have access to many more resources in order to be better. For instance according to RC2 a planet of 10 billion people with lives barely worth living might not be better than a planet of 8 billion people with wonderful lives. However, a galaxy full of 10 trillion people with lives barely worth living and huge amounts of resources might be better then the planet of 8 billion people with wonderful lives.
Would you agree that I have effectively refuted RC1, even if you don’t think I refuted RC2?
To me, that sounds like you are biting the bullet and accepting the Repugnant Conclusion. You just think that the conclusion isn’t so repugnant, because those worlds also differ in amount of resources.
Again, I think I might accept what you think the RC means (RC2). However, I do not accept my understanding of the Repugnant Conclusion (RC1), which is that in two otherwise identical worlds the one with the lower quality of live and larger population is better.
I think the reason my post is so heavily upvoted is that a great many members of this community have the same understanding of what the Repugnant Conclusion means as I do.
Is the following a fair summary of your position?: When looking at the possible future worlds that are reachable from a given starting point, a barely-worth-living world will never be the best world to aim for, because there is always a better option which has higher quality of living
My understanding of Parfit is that he believed the Mere Addition Paradox showed that a world that differed in no other way besides having a larger population size and a lower quality of life was better than one with a smaller population and a higher quality of life.
No, the statement is that for any world with a sufficiently high quality of life, there is some world that differs in no other way besides having a larger population size and a lower quality of life which is better.
I don’t see how your phrasing is significantly different from mine. In any case, I completely disagree with that statement. I believe that for any world with a large population size and a very low quality of life there is some world that differs in no other way besides having a smaller population size and a higher quality of life which is better.
The reason I believe this is that I have a pluralist theory of population ethics that holds that a world that devotes some of its efforts to creating lives worth living and some of its efforts to improve lives that already exist is better than a world that only does the former, all other things being equal.
Note that your statement does not contradict the Mere Addition Paradox.
You’re right. It doesn’t contradict it 100%. A world a trillion people with lives barely worth living might still be better than a world with a thousand people with great lives. However, it could well be worse than a world with half a trillion people with great lives.
What my theory primarily deals with is finding the optimal, world, the world that converts resources into utility most efficiently. I believe that a world with a moderately sized population with a high standard of living is the best world, all other things being equal.
However, you are quite correct that the Mere Addition Paradox could still apply if all things are not equal. A world with vastly more resources than the first one that converts all of its resources into building a titanic population of lives barely worth living might be better if its population is huge enough, because it might produce a greater amount of value in total, even if is less optimal (that is, it converts resources into value less efficiently). However, a world with the same amount of resources as that has a somewhat smaller population and a higher standard of living would be both better and more optimal.
So I think that my statement does contradict the Mere Addition Paradox in ceteris parabis situations, even if it doesn’t in situation where all things aren’t equal. And I think that’s something.
No. Your statement does not contradict the Mere Addition Paradox, even in, as you say, “ceteris paribus situations”. This is really a matter of first-order logic.
My understanding of Parfit is that he believed the Mere Addition Paradox showed that a world that differed in no other way besides having a larger population size and a lower quality of life was better than one with a smaller population and a higher quality of life. That’s why it’s called the Mere Addition Paradox, because you arrive at the Paradox by adding more people, redistributing resources, and doing nothing else. That is what I understand to be the Repugnant Conclusion. What makes it especially repugnant is that it implies that people in the here and now have a duty to overpopulate the world.
You seem to have understood the Repugnant Conclusion to be the belief that there is any possible society that has a larger population and lower quality of life than another society, but is also better than that society. To avoid quibbling over which of us has an accurate understanding of the topic I’ll just call my understanding of it RC1 and your understanding RC2.
I do not accept RC1. According to RC1 a world with a high population and low quality of life is better than a world that has the same amount of resources as the first world, a lower population, and a higher quality of life. I do not accept this. To me the second world is clearly better.
I might accept RC2. If I get your meaning RC2 means that there is always a better population that is larger and with lower quality of life, but it might have to be quite a bit larger and have access to many more resources in order to be better. For instance according to RC2 a planet of 10 billion people with lives barely worth living might not be better than a planet of 8 billion people with wonderful lives. However, a galaxy full of 10 trillion people with lives barely worth living and huge amounts of resources might be better then the planet of 8 billion people with wonderful lives.
Would you agree that I have effectively refuted RC1, even if you don’t think I refuted RC2?
Again, I think I might accept what you think the RC means (RC2). However, I do not accept my understanding of the Repugnant Conclusion (RC1), which is that in two otherwise identical worlds the one with the lower quality of live and larger population is better.
I think the reason my post is so heavily upvoted is that a great many members of this community have the same understanding of what the Repugnant Conclusion means as I do.
Yes.
No, the statement is that for any world with a sufficiently high quality of life, there is some world that differs in no other way besides having a larger population size and a lower quality of life which is better.
I don’t see how your phrasing is significantly different from mine. In any case, I completely disagree with that statement. I believe that for any world with a large population size and a very low quality of life there is some world that differs in no other way besides having a smaller population size and a higher quality of life which is better.
The reason I believe this is that I have a pluralist theory of population ethics that holds that a world that devotes some of its efforts to creating lives worth living and some of its efforts to improve lives that already exist is better than a world that only does the former, all other things being equal.
Note that your statement does not contradict the Mere Addition Paradox.
You’re right. It doesn’t contradict it 100%. A world a trillion people with lives barely worth living might still be better than a world with a thousand people with great lives. However, it could well be worse than a world with half a trillion people with great lives.
What my theory primarily deals with is finding the optimal, world, the world that converts resources into utility most efficiently. I believe that a world with a moderately sized population with a high standard of living is the best world, all other things being equal.
However, you are quite correct that the Mere Addition Paradox could still apply if all things are not equal. A world with vastly more resources than the first one that converts all of its resources into building a titanic population of lives barely worth living might be better if its population is huge enough, because it might produce a greater amount of value in total, even if is less optimal (that is, it converts resources into value less efficiently). However, a world with the same amount of resources as that has a somewhat smaller population and a higher standard of living would be both better and more optimal.
So I think that my statement does contradict the Mere Addition Paradox in ceteris parabis situations, even if it doesn’t in situation where all things aren’t equal. And I think that’s something.
No. Your statement does not contradict the Mere Addition Paradox, even in, as you say, “ceteris paribus situations”. This is really a matter of first-order logic.