I don’t see how your phrasing is significantly different from mine. In any case, I completely disagree with that statement. I believe that for any world with a large population size and a very low quality of life there is some world that differs in no other way besides having a smaller population size and a higher quality of life which is better.
The reason I believe this is that I have a pluralist theory of population ethics that holds that a world that devotes some of its efforts to creating lives worth living and some of its efforts to improve lives that already exist is better than a world that only does the former, all other things being equal.
Note that your statement does not contradict the Mere Addition Paradox.
You’re right. It doesn’t contradict it 100%. A world a trillion people with lives barely worth living might still be better than a world with a thousand people with great lives. However, it could well be worse than a world with half a trillion people with great lives.
What my theory primarily deals with is finding the optimal, world, the world that converts resources into utility most efficiently. I believe that a world with a moderately sized population with a high standard of living is the best world, all other things being equal.
However, you are quite correct that the Mere Addition Paradox could still apply if all things are not equal. A world with vastly more resources than the first one that converts all of its resources into building a titanic population of lives barely worth living might be better if its population is huge enough, because it might produce a greater amount of value in total, even if is less optimal (that is, it converts resources into value less efficiently). However, a world with the same amount of resources as that has a somewhat smaller population and a higher standard of living would be both better and more optimal.
So I think that my statement does contradict the Mere Addition Paradox in ceteris parabis situations, even if it doesn’t in situation where all things aren’t equal. And I think that’s something.
No. Your statement does not contradict the Mere Addition Paradox, even in, as you say, “ceteris paribus situations”. This is really a matter of first-order logic.
I don’t see how your phrasing is significantly different from mine. In any case, I completely disagree with that statement. I believe that for any world with a large population size and a very low quality of life there is some world that differs in no other way besides having a smaller population size and a higher quality of life which is better.
The reason I believe this is that I have a pluralist theory of population ethics that holds that a world that devotes some of its efforts to creating lives worth living and some of its efforts to improve lives that already exist is better than a world that only does the former, all other things being equal.
Note that your statement does not contradict the Mere Addition Paradox.
You’re right. It doesn’t contradict it 100%. A world a trillion people with lives barely worth living might still be better than a world with a thousand people with great lives. However, it could well be worse than a world with half a trillion people with great lives.
What my theory primarily deals with is finding the optimal, world, the world that converts resources into utility most efficiently. I believe that a world with a moderately sized population with a high standard of living is the best world, all other things being equal.
However, you are quite correct that the Mere Addition Paradox could still apply if all things are not equal. A world with vastly more resources than the first one that converts all of its resources into building a titanic population of lives barely worth living might be better if its population is huge enough, because it might produce a greater amount of value in total, even if is less optimal (that is, it converts resources into value less efficiently). However, a world with the same amount of resources as that has a somewhat smaller population and a higher standard of living would be both better and more optimal.
So I think that my statement does contradict the Mere Addition Paradox in ceteris parabis situations, even if it doesn’t in situation where all things aren’t equal. And I think that’s something.
No. Your statement does not contradict the Mere Addition Paradox, even in, as you say, “ceteris paribus situations”. This is really a matter of first-order logic.